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Article 
Too Big To Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, 
and Corporate Responsibility 
Steven L. Schwarcz† 
  INTRODUCTION   
There is an increasing worldwide regulatory focus on trying 
to end the problem of too big to fail (TBTF)1: that systemically 
important financial firms2 might engage in excessive risk-taking 
because they would profit from success and be bailed out by the 
government to avoid a failure. This is primarily a problem of 
moral hazard;3 persons protected from the negative conse-
quences of their risky actions will be tempted to take more 
risks.4 Excessive risk-taking was widely seen as one of the pri-
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 1. See, e.g., Too Big To Fail, Too Big To Exist Act, S. 1206, 114 Cong. 
(2015); INDEP. CMTY. BANKERS OF AM., ENDING TOO BIG TO FAIL (Jun. 25, 
2013), https://www.icba.org/docs/default-source/icba/news-documents/press 
-release/2013/endtbtfstudy.pdf. 
 2. The acronym TBTF is sometimes used as an adjective by referring to 
systemically important financial firms as TBTF firms. For clarity, this Article 
hereinafter refers to these firms as simply systemically important firms. 
 3. Although TBTF has also been described as a problem of taxpayer-
funded government bailouts, that description is partly circular. A systemically 
important firm would only need a bailout to avoid failure, and failure would 
most likely result from excessive risk-taking. If that risk-taking could be con-
trolled, the need for government bailouts would be greatly reduced. Part IV.A 
of this Article examines how to control that risk-taking. Part IV.B of the Article 
examines how to minimize the public cost of bailing out systemically important 
firms that would fail notwithstanding that risk-taking control. See infra notes 
172–91 and accompanying text. 
 4. See, e.g., GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE 
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mary causes of the 2007–2008 financial crisis (the “financial cri-
sis”),5 and it is regarded as a continuing threat that can misallo-
cate resources, increase public costs by necessitating govern-
ment bailouts,6 and even cause another economic collapse.7 
For these reasons, much of the financial regulation respond-
ing to the financial crisis, including the Dodd-Frank Act8—
whose very preface states it is “[a]n Act . . . to end ‘too big to 
fail’”—has been inspired at least in part by the goal of ending 
TBTF.9 The principal domestic effort to achieve that goal is cur-
rently being undertaken by the Minneapolis Federal Reserve 
Bank (the “Minneapolis Fed”) under the leadership of its current 
 
HAZARDS OF BANK BAILOUTS (2004); Neel Kashkari, President and CEO, Fed. 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Lessons from the Crisis: Ending Too Big To Fail, 
Remarks at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 16, 2016), https:// 
www.minneapolisfed.org/~/media/files/news_events/pres/kashkari-ending-tbtf 
-02-16-2016.pdf (referring to “the risks and challenges posed by large banks and 
moral hazard”). 
 5. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE 
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES xviii–xix (2011) (iden-
tifying excessive risk-taking by systemically important firms as a primary cause 
of the financial crisis); Jacob J. Lew, Opinion, Let’s Leave Wall Street’s Risky 
Practices in the Past, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/opinions/jacob-lew-lets-leave-wall-streets-risky-practices-in-the-past/ 
2015/01/09/cf25b5f6-95d8-11e4-aabd-d0b93ff613d5_story.html (repeatedly at-
tributing the financial crisis to “excessive risks taken by financial” firms); The 
Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash Course, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013), http:// 
www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are 
-still-being-felt-five-years-article (identifying excessive risk-taking as one of 
three causes of the financial crisis, the other causes being irresponsible lending 
and regulators being “asleep at the wheel”). 
 6. For discussion of the ongoing concern of regulators over public costs as-
sociated with bailouts of systemically important firms, see Gustavo Gari, Using 
Bazookas and Firewalls To Regulate Systemic Risk in the Financial Market: The 
Problems with Bailouts and Bank Breakups and the Case for Network Intercon-
nectivity, 12 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 155, 165 (2013) (noting that Congress enacted 
the Dodd-Frank Act to try to avoid the need for taxpayer-funded bailouts of sys-
temically important firms); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A 
Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 
951, 1021 (2011).  
 7. STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 23–28. 
 8. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,  
12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5641 (2012). 
 9. Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent 
Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. 
L. REV. 795, 797–98 (2011) (arguing that the Dodd-Frank Act is directed at free-
ing the public from again having to choose between the unpalatable externali-
ties of bearing the cost of a massive infusion of capital into a firm whose risk-
taking has left it facing collapse, and a possible systemic collapse). 
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President, former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Finan-
cial Stability Neel Kashkari.10 Kashkari claims “there is no ques-
tion that [the] presence [of systemically important banks] at the 
center of our financial system contributed significantly to the 
magnitude of the [financial] crisis and to the extensive damage 
it inflicted across the economy.”11 He also sees “widespread 
agreement among elected leaders, regulators and Main Street 
that we must solve the problem of TBTF.”12 
The principal international effort to end TBTF is being led 
by the Financial Stability Board,13 an organization established 
by the G20 nations to monitor and make recommendations about 
the global financial system. To that end, the Financial Stability 
Board has published “two final guidance papers to assist the res-
olution planning work of authorities and firms, as part of the 
policy agenda to end ‘too-big-to-fail.’”14 These papers discuss, 
among other things, the progress in the “development of policies 
to address the risks posed by too-big-to-fail banks” in order to 
“contribute to greater resolvability of systemically important 
firms and resilience of the financial system.”15 
This Article argues that, contrary to currently accepted reg-
ulatory wisdom, the problem of TBTF is exaggerated. The cen-
tral evil of TBTF is based on an assumption: that the expectation 
of a bailout will cause systemically important firms to engage in 
 
 10. Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Seeking Comment on Ending Too 
Big To Fail, https://minneapolisfed.org/publications/special-studies/endingtbtf/ 
share-your-ideas (online form allowing individuals to submit “ideas, input and 
research” to help guide the initiative). Kashkari hoped to announce a formalized 
plan to end TBTF by the end of 2016. Kashkari, supra note 4, at 2. 
 11. Kashkari, supra note 4, at 2. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See, e.g., John Glover & Ilya Arkhipov, End of ‘Too-Big-To-Fail’ Bank-
ing Era Endorsed by World Leaders, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 15, 2015), http://www 
.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-15/end-of-too-big-to-fail-banking-era 
-endorsed-by-world-leaders (“World leaders [from the G20 nations] are set to 
endorse plans by regulators to end the era of too-big-to-fail banks, forcing them 
to raise as much as $1.2 trillion, and backed proposals to wrap up sweeping 
reforms of rules for the global banking system.”). 
 14. Press Release, Fin. Stability Bd., FSB Publishes Further Guidance on 
Resolution Planning and Fifth Report to the G20 on Progress in Resolution 
(Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.fsb.org/2016/08/fsb-publishes-further-guidance-on 
-resolution-planning-and-fifth-report-to-the-g20-on-progress-in-resolution. 
 15. FIN. STABILITY BD., RESILIENCE THROUGH RESOLVABILITY – MOVING 
FROM POLICY DESIGN TO IMPLEMENTATION: 5TH REPORT TO THE G20 ON PRO-
GRESS IN RESOLUTION 4 (2016), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
Resilience-through-resolvability-–-moving-from-policy-design-to 
-implementation.pdf. 
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morally hazardous, and thus excessive, risk-taking.16 This Arti-
cle contends that excessive corporate risk-taking is not caused 
by bailout-induced moral hazard (hereinafter, “moral hazard”).17 
Rather, such risk-taking is more likely caused by other factors,18 
including the governance requirement that corporate manag-
ers—including managers of systemically important firms—view 
the consequences of their firm’s actions from the standpoint of 
the firm and its investors, ignoring systemic externalities that 
can harm the public. As a result, regulating excessive risk-tak-
ing by ending TBTF can be inefficient,19 ineffective,20 and some-
times even dangerous.21 Excessive risk-taking can, and should, 
be more directly and efficiently regulated by altering the govern-
ance of systemically important firms. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I shows there is no ev-
idence that moral hazard is the cause of excessive corporate risk-
taking by systemically important firms. To the contrary, such 
firms are often so large and their actions so subject to scrutiny 
 
 16. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. Although in theory a sys-
temically important firm might not necessarily be TBTF, the financial literature 
treats the two synonymously. See, e.g., MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R42150, SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT OR “TOO BIG TO FAIL” FINANCIAL IN-
STITUTIONS (2017) (treating systemically important firms as TBTF). This Arti-
cle follows this approach to the extent that it assumes for analytical purposes 
that systemically important firms could be TBTF. 
 17. This Article refers to moral hazard in the bailout-induced sense, which 
is commonly linked to the problem of TBTF. In its broadest sense, moral hazard 
can refer to any “condition that insulates someone from the risk of or responsi-
bility for an action.” BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 710 (Stephen Michael Sheppard, 
ed., compact ed., 2011). In that sense, a firm’s externalization of systemic harm 
also creates moral hazard. 
 18. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power 
and Limits of Law, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 815 (discussing other factors that can 
cause systemically important firms to engage in excessive risk-taking, including 
limited liability and conflicts of interest between the firm’s secondary and senior 
managers). 
 19. TBTF regulation that focuses on limiting the size of systemically im-
portant firms can, for example, reduce economies of scale and scope. See infra 
notes 69–78 and accompanying text. 
 20. TBTF-motivated regulation that imposes higher capital requirements 
may not, for example, discourage excessive risk-taking. See infra notes 90–96 
and accompanying text. And TBTF-motivated regulation that attempts to con-
vert debt to equity has never been truly tested, can raise its own moral hazard 
concern, and may well make that debt too expensive. See infra notes 117–25 and 
accompanying text.  
 21. The Dodd-Frank Act’s TBTF-motivated restriction of the Federal Re-
serve’s authority to act as a lender of last resort to systemically important firms 
exacerbates the risk, for example, that a failing firm will trigger another finan-
cial crisis. See infra notes 128–32 and accompanying text. 
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that they would have difficulty taking excessive risks in the ex-
pectation of a bailout; they are, in the words of this Article’s title, 
“too big to fool” the public. Part II explains why other factors can 
cause those firms to engage in excessive risk-taking. Part III an-
alyzes why regulatory solutions to limit TBTF are misguided. 
Part IV shows how excessive risk-taking can, and should, be 
more directly regulated by internalizing the costs of systemic ex-
ternalities and bailouts. 
I.  TBTF DOES NOT CAUSE MORALLY HAZARDOUS 
BEHAVIOR   
There is no evidence, much less proof, that TBTF causes 
firms to engage in morally hazardous behavior. Most studies dis-
cussing such behavior merely assume it without actually offer-
ing evidence.22 Other studies conflate correlation and causation, 
assuming that if many systemically important firms engage in 
risky behavior, their behavior was predicated on bailout expec-
tations.23 The fallacy of that logic is clear: 
 
 22. See, e.g., JACOPO CARMASSI ET AL., OVERCOMING TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL: A 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK TO LIMIT MORAL HAZARD AND FREE RIDING IN THE 
FINANCIAL SECTOR 16 (2010) (stating that “a blanket protection may exacerbate 
moral hazard and compromise market discipline”) (emphasis added); Lawrence 
G. Baxter, Fundamental Forces Driving United States and International Finan-
cial Regulation Reform, 6 SUNGKYUNKWAN J. SCI. & TECH. L. 105, 113 (2012) 
(“The TBTF status [of certain] institutions . . . creates a class of institutions 
that are, in effect, ‘protected’ by government. They are able to borrow at lower 
cost because creditors do not believe they will be allowed to fail, and moral haz-
ard is correspondingly increased as their managers become less sensitive to the 
costs of potential failure.”); Frederic S. Mishkin et al., How Big a Problem Is Too 
Big To Fail? A Review of Gary Stern and Ron Feldman’s “Too Big To Fail: The 
Hazards of Bank Bailouts,” 44 J. ECON. LIT. 988, 990 (2006) (“The result of the 
too-big-to-fail policy is that large banks are likely to take on greater risks, 
thereby making bank failures more likely.”) (emphasis added). 
 23. See, e.g., Ning Gong & Kenneth D. Jones, Bailouts, Monitoring, and 
Penalties: An Integrated Framework of Government Policies To Manage the Too-
Big-To-Fail Problem, 13 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 299, 300 (“In this paper, we 
analyze the formulation of a government’s bailout policy. Our model is based on 
three premises. First, a bank can choose either a safer or a riskier project (port-
folio). Without any subsidy or bailout in the event of failure of the projects, 
shareholders prefer safer projects. Second, with a government subsidy (effec-
tively bailout) in the event of failure, shareholders prefer riskier projects to the 
safer ones.”); Ann Graham, Bringing to Heel the Elephants in the Economy: The 
Case for Ending “Too Big To Fail,” 8 PIERCE L. REV. 117, 125 n.40 (2010) (stat-
ing that, because many systemically important banks returned to “risky” be-
havior a year after being bailed out, namely “betting big on bonds, commodities 
and exotic financial products”—they were reliant on the promise of TBTF pro-
tection; Manja Völz & Michael Wedow, Market Discipline and Too-Big-To-Fail 
 766 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:761 
 
Bailed-out banks are, by definition, in some sort of distress and exhibit 
high risk. But this might be simply due to bad luck rather than to bad 
behavior. Even a prudently managed bank might be distressed because 
of an exogenous shock. Using the bailout of such an unlucky bank to 
explain its risk is no evidence for moral hazard. Moral hazard problems 
arise only from the additional risk taking due to higher bailout expec-
tations, which are usually not observable. . . . Econometrically, the 
identification of moral hazard therefore requires variables that well ex-
plain the likelihood of a bank bailout, but are uncorrelated with the 
risk taking of banks.24 
The economic studies purporting to “prove” that TBTF 
causes firms to engage in morally hazardous behavior merely 
show that systemically important firms can borrow at lower-
than-average cost.25 Economists presume this funding ad-
vantage derives from investor belief that these firms will be 
bailed out before they default.26 That presumption, however, is 
 
in the CDS Market: Does Banks’ Size Reduce Market Discipline?, 18 J. EMPIRI-
CAL FIN. 195, 196 (2011) (“In practice, the TBTF policy appears to have been 
extended to varying degrees to banks outside the top eleven, which has led to 
excessive risk taking by large banks.”). 
 24. Lammertjan Dam & Michael Koetter, Bank Bailouts and Moral Haz-
ard: Evidence from Germany, 25 REV. FIN. STUDS. 2343, 2344 (2012); cf. Skylar 
Brooks & Domenico Lombardi, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Backgrounder, 
GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING (forthcoming) 
(manuscript at 9), http://new-rules.org/storage/documents/sovereign_debt_ 
restructuring_background_paper_draft2014.pdf (discussing the difficulty of em-
pirically identifying morally hazardous behavior in a sovereign debt context). 
 25. See, e.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., CALIBRATING 
THE GSIB SURCHARGE 13 (2015) (stating that some of the largest systemically 
important firms are believed to have a funding advantage). Former Federal Re-
serve Chairman Alan Greenspan has estimated informally that systemically 
important firms can borrow at a funding advantage of fifty basis points. See 
Regulation and Resolving Institutions Considered “Too Big To Fail”: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 34 
(2009) (statement of Martin Neil Baily & Robert E. Litan, referencing Chairman 
Greenspan’s estimate). 
 26. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 25, at 13 
(stating that the funding advantage “derives from the belief of some creditors 
that the government might act to prevent [a systemically important firm] from 
defaulting on its debts,” and that this funding advantage “creates an incentive 
for [those firms] to take on even more leverage and make themselves even more 
systemic (in order to increase the value of the [funding advantage] subsidy”)). 
Compare MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42150, SYSTEMICALLY IM-
PORTANT OR “TOO BIG TO FAIL” FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 22 (2014) (describing 
as the “worst-case scenario” the possibility that government protection of sys-
temically important firms “would provide a competitive advantage that would 
enable more risk taking than before”), with Thomas F. Huertas, Resolution Re-
form, 13 FIN. & ECON. REV. 86, 88 (2014) (“If the market expects the government 
to be able and willing to bail out banks . . . then such banks can borrow at lower 
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unjustified. There are many other reasons besides the expecta-
tion of a bailout why systemically important firms, which usu-
ally are large,27 can borrow at lower-than-average cost, including 
that large firms generally have: (1) economies of scale;28 (2) bet-
ter access to debt markets;29 (3) larger dividend pay-out ratios;30 
and (4) credit that is less vulnerable to market disruption.31 Nor 
do those studies attempt to examine whether systemically im-
portant firms can borrow at lower cost than nonsystemically im-
portant large firms.32 
 
cost than they would be able to do strictly on the basis of their stand-alone rat-
ing. This encourages risk-taking at the bank, creating what economists term 
‘moral hazard.’”). 
 27. Cf. infra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing why systemically 
important firms are usually large). 
 28. VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL., THE END OF MARKET DISCIPLINE? INVESTOR 
EXPECTATIONS OF IMPLICIT GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES 4 (2016). 
 29. ANTONIOS ANTONIOU ET AL., DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE: EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 4 (2002). Large firms gen-
erally have better access to debt markets for reasons other than a TBTF percep-
tion. Most studies of that access make no reference to TBTF. See, e.g., Jan Bar-
tholdy & Cesário Mateus, Debt and Taxes for Private Firms, 20 INT’L REV. FIN. 
ANALYSIS 177, 177 (2011) (observing that “relatively large” firms generally have 
good access to debt markets because they are often “public on a stock exchange 
[and] financially sophisticated”); Armen Hovakimian et al., Are Corporate De-
fault Probabilities Consistent with the Static Trade-off Theory?, 25 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 315, 317 (2012) (observing that “larger firms are less risky, have lower 
proportional bankruptcy costs, and have better access to debt markets”). 
 30. Christian Schoder, Demand, q, Financial Constraints and Shareholder 
Value Revisited: An Econometric Micro-analysis of US Fixed Investment, 7 INT’L 
J. ECON. & BUS. RESEARCH 28, 40 (2014). 
 31. Karen Gordon Mills & Brayden McCarthy, The State of Small Business 
Lending: Credit Access During the Recovery and How Technology May Change 
the Game 6 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 15-004, 2014); cf. ORCUN 
KAYA, CAPITAL MARKETS UNION: AN AMBITIOUS GOAL, BUT FEW QUICK WINS 
13 (Jan Schildbach ed., 2015) (discussing why banks have taken a cautious 
stance in lending to Euro-area small and medium size enterprises). 
 32. One of the most rigorous economic studies relied on by advocates of 
bailout-induced moral hazard is Bryan Kelly et al., Too-Systemic-To-Fail: What 
Option Markets Imply About Sector-Wide Government Guarantees, 106 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1278 (2016). The authors provide “new evidence from option prices 
that suggests the [U.S.] government absorbed aggregate tail risk during the 
2007–2009 financial crisis by providing a sector-wide bailout guarantee to the 
financial sector.” Id. at 1318. In the words of the authors, though, this evidence 
only suggests that the government provided a bailout guarantee. Id. Further-
more, they make no claim that systemically important firms engaged in bailout-
induced moral hazard. Even more significantly, their evidence of a “sector-wide 
bailout guarantee” does not apply to “individual banks.” Id. at 1279. To the con-
trary, they find that individual banks did not benefit from that guarantee. Id. 
They explain that result as follows: “[A]ny individual bank may still fail amid a 
collective guarantee . . . .” Id. 
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The idea that TBTF causes systemically important firms to 
engage in morally hazardous behavior is also antithetical to 
managerial incentives. Managers take serious personal risks 
when they cause their firms to engage in excessive risk-taking 
with the expectation that the firm will be bailed out by the gov-
ernment. If, as in the case of Lehman Brothers, the government 
fails to bail out the firm, those managers are almost certain to 
lose their jobs.33 Even if there is a bailout, it may well be condi-
tioned on culpable managers resigning or otherwise giving rec-
ompense.34 In either case, the ensuing reputational damage 
could permanently end a manager’s financial career.35 
Moreover, systemically important firms are usually large,36 
and—by virtue of being systemically important—their actions 
are subject to more media and political scrutiny than ordinary 
firms.37 If they take excessive risks in the expectation of a 
bailout, such firms will almost certainly be recognized and sub-
jected to harsh criticism.38 
So why is there such a widespread belief that systemically 
important firms engage in morally hazardous behavior? One rea-
son, perhaps, is that moral hazard is a common explanation for 
any excessive risk-taking,39 including excessive risk-taking by 
 
 33. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy 
and Investment Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 278 (1991) (“In practice, when a 
publicly held corporation files for bankruptcy, many top managers lose their 
jobs at the same time.”). 
 34. See, e.g., JEFFREY FRIEDMAN & WLADIMIR KRAUS, ENGINEERING THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS: SYSTEMIC RISK AND THE FAILURE OF REGULATION 43 (2011) 
(“[W]hen Continental Illinois failed, its managers were fired and its sharehold-
ers were wiped out, and when [Long Term Capital Management] was bailed out, 
its principals were essentially wiped out, too. It would not be logical for any self-
interested bank executive to run a bank into the ground because of his or her 
belief that it would then be bailed out if she would then be fired (and, if com-
pensated with equities, wiped out.)”). 
 35. Id.  
 36. See INT’L MONETARY FUND ET AL., GUIDANCE TO ASSESS THE SYSTEMIC 
IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS AND INSTRUMENTS: INI-
TIAL CONSIDERATIONS (2009), https://www.bis.org/publ/othp07.pdf (discussing 
size as one of the key factors for determining a firm’s systemic importance). 
 37. See, e.g., DELOITTE CTR. FOR REGULATORY STRATEGIES, SIFI DESIGNA-
TION AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON NONBANK FINANCIAL COMPANIES 6 
(2013), http://www.fsroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/SIFI 
-designation-and-its-potential-impact-on-nonbank-financial-companies.pdf 
(“SIFI designation indicates considerable additional scrutiny for a company.”).  
 38. That explains, as mentioned (see supra text accompanying notes 21–
22), this Article’s title—“too big to fool” the public. 
 39. See, e.g., Aviva Aron-Dine et al., Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: Do 
Dynamic Incentives Matter?, 97 REV. ECON. & STAT. 725 (2015) (finding moral 
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firms.40 Attributing excessive corporate risk-taking to moral 
hazard also accords with the human inclination, inflamed by pol-
iticians and the media, to view harm as being caused by wrong-
doers.41 It also goes without saying that “too big to fail” is a great 
sound-bite. 
II.  OTHER FACTORS CAUSE SYSTEMICALLY 
IMPORTANT FIRMS TO ENGAGE IN EXCESSIVE RISK-
TAKING   
If moral hazard does not cause systemically important firms 
to take excessive risks, then why do they sometimes engage in 
that risk-taking? There are several possible alternative explana-
tions. To some extent, excessive risk-taking may result from a 
misalignment between managerial and investor interests.42 As 
later discussed, however, even perfectly aligning those interests 
would not sufficiently control that risk-taking.43 Another possi-
ble explanation is that limited liability motivates shareholders 
of systemically important firms to take risks that could generate 
outsized personal profits, even if that greatly increases systemic 
risk.44 But that explanation is incomplete because it is mostly 
 
hazard in health insurance markets); J. David Cummins & Sharon Tennyson, 
Moral Hazard in Insurance Claiming: Evidence from Automobile Insurance, 12 
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 29 (1996) (finding moral hazard in automobile insur-
ance markets); Steven J. Harper, Bankruptcy and Bad Behavior: The Real 
Moral Hazard: Law Schools Exploiting Market Dysfunction, 23 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 347, 365 (2015) (finding moral hazard by law schools “engag[ing] 
in bad behavior that fills classrooms and maximizes revenues” as the cost of 
tuition rises); Alan J. Kuperman, The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Interven-
tion: Lessons from the Balkans, 52 INT’L STUD. Q. 49 (2008) (finding moral haz-
ard by humanitarian actors in cases of genocide and ethnic cleansing); James 
D. Shilling, Introduction to the Special Issue of International Real Estate Re-
view, 18 INT’L REAL EST. REV. 149 (2015) (finding moral hazard in the housing 
market).  
 40. See, e.g., David Rowell & Luke B. Connelly, A History of the Term 
“Moral Hazard”, 79 J. RISK & INS. 1051 (2012). 
 41. This fundamental attribution bias not only leads observers to believe 
events are caused by people rather than external factors, but also prevents ob-
servers from seeking deeper reasons behind an event once a sufficient reason—
like moral hazard by human actors—is found. See Dominik Duell & Dimitri 
Landa, Attribution Bias in Strategic Environments, EPSA 2013 ANN. GEN. 
CONF. PAPER 744, at 1, 7 (2013). 
 42. See infra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 43. Cf. infra note 147 and accompanying text (arguing that systemic exter-
nalities result from a different misalignment of interests: between the firm, its 
investors, and its managers on the one hand, and the public on the other hand). 
 44. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Governance Structure of Shadow Banking: 
Rethinking Assumptions About Limited Liability, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 
27–28 (2014). 
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limited to relatively small systemically important firms, such as 
hedge funds, that are managed directly by their primary inves-
tors.45 
Examining the corporate governance process reveals a more 
fundamental reason for excessive risk-taking. As part of their 
governance duties, a firm’s managers46 engage the firm in risk-
taking in order to maximize profitability for the firm and its in-
vestors—principally its shareholders.47 This shareholder pri-
macy governance rule48 creates a conflict between private and 
public interests: risk-taking that is excessive from a public per-
spective, in that it has a negative expected value to the public,49 
might benefit the firm and its investors.50 For nonsystemically 
important firms, this conflict is either inconsequential51 or ad-
dressed through laws that prohibit the firm from causing harm 
or require the firm to internalize harmful costs.52  
For systemically important firms, however, the conflict can 
be highly consequential—especially if the risk-taking decision 
causes the firm to fail, externalizing systemic harm onto other 
market participants and the public, including ordinary citizens 
affected by an economic collapse.53 Annex 1 to this Article illus-
 
 45. Id. at 18. 
 46. See, e.g., Christine Hurt, The Duty To Manage Risk, 39 J. CORP. L. 253, 
256–57 (2014). By “managers,” I refer to those with ultimate responsibility to 
run the firm, such as a corporation’s directors. 
 47. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FI-
NANCE 9–10 (10th ed. 2011). 
 48. Cf. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Cor-
porate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 443–48 (2001) (discussing the ideological conver-
gence worldwide of shareholder primacy as a governance rule). 
 49. The expected value of an action to a party is determined by comparing 
the expected benefits and costs of the action to that party. Expected value thus 
depends on the party on whom the impact is being measured. 
 50. Steven L. Schwarcz, Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public 
Duty, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 3 (2016) [hereinafter Misalignment]. 
 51. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Collapsing Corporate Structures: Resolving the 
Tension Between Form and Substance, 60 BUS. LAW. 109, 144 (2004) (observing 
that corporate risk-taking routinely causes externalities). 
 52. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOM-
ICS 425 (2002) (arguing that negative externalities created by corporate conduct 
should be “constrained through general welfare legislation, tort litigation, and 
other forms of regulation”). 
 53. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204–06 (2008) 
[hereinafter Systemic Risk]. See also John Crawford, The Moral Hazard Para-
dox of Financial Safety Nets, CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 138 (“Financial 
firms . . . are under-incentivized to insure at the optimal level, given the fact 
that the potential systemic costs of their own failure would be borne primarily 
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trates this impact, using the example of a systemically im-
portant firm whose risk-taking has a positive expected value to 
its investors but a negative expected value to the public. Also, 
this public-versus-private conflict has not yet been effectively ad-
dressed through laws for systemically important firms. Tradi-
tional regulatory approaches, such as imposing legal prohibi-
tions or requirements to internalize harmful systemic costs,54 
have failed.55 That failure has led to the type of frustration ex-
pressed as the consensus of an international conference on finan-
cial regulation sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston: 
“policy makers have made little progress in figuring out how 
they might actually” prevent another financial crisis.56  
There is another way to resolve the conflict. Regulators 
should re-examine the corporate governance rule that actually 
creates the conflict.57 This approach is somewhat iconoclastic; 
the law ordinarily avoids regulating corporate governance to ad-
dress externalities because interfering with governance is 
thought to “weaken[] the wealth-producing capacities of the 
firm.”58 Part IV will explain, however, how corporate governance 
 
by others.”); cf. Alessio M. Pacces, Illiquidity and Financial Crisis, 74 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 383, 417 (2013) (arguing that it “may be tempting to simply let banks 
bear the consequences of their” risk-taking, but a bank failure might “affect[ ] 
all banks and the entire economy”). This market failure could be viewed as a 
type of tragedy of the commons, insofar as market participants suffer from the 
actions of other market participants depleting the shared resource of a common 
financial market. Cf. Antonio Cabrales et al., Risk-Sharing and Contagion in 
Networks, CESifo Working Paper No. 4715, 34 (2014) (“[T]ension arises from 
the fact that firms have always an incentive to form connected components of 
the size that minimizes the default probability of their members, thus ignoring 
the negative externality this behavior imposes on other firms.”). It also could be 
viewed as a more standard externality—and thus as a form of moral hazard, 
though not bailout-induced moral hazard—insofar as nonmarket participants 
(i.e., the citizens affected by an economic collapse) suffer from the actions of 
market participants. 
 54. Cf. supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text (referencing the applica-
tion of traditional regulatory approaches to nonsystemically important firms). 
 55. See Misalignment, supra note 50, at 17–21 (demonstrating that sub-
stantive legal prohibitions and requirements to internalize harm may be “insuf-
ficient . . . to control the excessive corporate risk-taking that causes systemic 
externalities”). 
 56. Binyamin Appelbaum, Skepticism Prevails on Preventing Crisis, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 5, 2015, at B1. 
 57. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text (discussing shareholder 
primacy). 
 58. Ian B. Lee, The Role of the Public Interest in Corporate Law, in RE-
SEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 106, 124 (Claire A. 
Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012). See also Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas 
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law could be modified to resolve the conflict without unduly 
weakening the wealth production of systemically important 
firms.  
In the financial context of this Article, focusing on corporate 
governance has another advantage over traditional regulatory 
approaches. Traditional approaches often depend on regulators 
precisely understanding the particular design and structure of 
financial firms, markets, and other related institutions at the 
time the regulation is promulgated.59 Because these institutions 
constantly change,60 traditional regulation becomes obsolete un-
less it is continuously updated to adapt to the changes.61 Such 
updating, however, can be costly and “is subject to political in-
terference at each updating stage.”62 As a result, traditional reg-
ulation usually lags financial innovation.63 Regulating corporate 
governance can overcome that regulatory time lag; if the firm is 
proposing to engage in a risky financial innovation, its managers 
 
Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension Between Conservative Cor-
porate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 380–81 
(2015) (contending that the most responsible, legitimate, and effective way to 
control externalities is to have the “legitimate instruments of the people’s will, 
reflective of their desire, set the boundaries for corporate conduct”); cf. Milton 
Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is To Increase Its Profits, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 122, 124 (arguing that managers lack the polit-
ical legitimacy and expertise to consider social interests).  
 59. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Change: A Functional Ap-
proach, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1441, 1442 (2016) [hereinafter Regulating Financial 
Change]. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Cf. PERRY MEHRLING, THE NEW LOMBARD STREET: HOW THE FED BE-
CAME THE DEALER OF LAST RESORT 4–5 (2011) (arguing that because economics 
and finance “largely ignore the sophisticated mechanism that operates to chan-
nel cash flows . . . to meet cash commitments,” they have not “been particularly 
well suited for understanding the . . . [financial] crisis during which the crucial 
monetary plumbing broke down”). 
 62. Regulating Financial Change, supra note 59, at 1443. 
 63. Id. See also Edward J. Kane, Policy Implications of Structural Changes 
in Financial Markets, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 96, 97 (1983) (describing how regula-
tory responses lag behind innovations). In 2007, for example, the precrisis fi-
nancial regulatory framework, which assumed the dominance of bank-interme-
diated funding, failed to adequately address a collapsing financial system in 
which the majority of funding had become nonbank intermediated. Regulating 
Financial Change, supra note 59, at 1443–44. Cf. Julia Black, Restructuring 
Global and EU Financial Regulation: Character, Capacities, and Learning, in 
FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION: A POST-CRISIS ANALYSIS 13 (Eddy 
Wymeersch et al. eds., 2012) (“[T]he system simply did not operate in the way 
that regulators, banks, and economists had thought it did. If you do not under-
stand how the system works, it is very hard to build in mechanisms either for 
managing risk or for ensuring the system’s resilience when those risks crystal-
lize.”). 
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must try to obtain the most current information about the inno-
vation and its consequences. 
III.  TBTF-BASED REGULATION OF EXCESSIVE RISK-
TAKING IS MISGUIDED   
If the assumption that moral hazard causes systemically im-
portant firms to engage in excessive risk-taking is incorrect, then 
regulation starting from that assumption is unlikely to control 
that risk-taking and could even be harmful. This Part demon-
strates that danger by examining the principal TBTF-based ap-
proaches to regulating excessive risk-taking that have been en-
acted into law or are being contemplated. 
One such approach, breaking up firms and limiting their 
size, discussed in Section A,64 seeks to reduce the number of sys-
temically important firms in the first place. Another approach, 
imposing higher capital requirements, discussed in Section B,65 
seeks to make systemically important firms more robust so they 
are unlikely to experience financial problems. A third approach, 
converting debt to equity, discussed in Section C,66 seeks to pre-
engineer a change to a systemically important firm’s capital 
structure that is triggered if the firm experiences financial prob-
lems—in effect, a pre-planned debt workout. A fourth approach, 
discussed in Section D,67 seeks to control the failure of a system-
ically important firm in order to reduce moral hazard and the 
need for a bailout. The examination shows that these approaches 
can be inefficient, ineffective, or sometimes even dangerous.68  
 
 64. See infra notes 69–81 and accompanying text. 
 65. See infra notes 82–109 and accompanying text. 
 66. See infra notes 115–25 and accompanying text. 
 67. See infra notes 128–46 and accompanying text. 
 68. On a more theoretical level, one might argue that any TBTF-based ap-
proach to regulating excessive risk-taking could backfire. Any such approach is 
primarily microprudential: it is designed to protect individual financial firms. 
Even though such an approach is also incidentally macroprudential (i.e., pro-
tective of the financial system) by making it less likely that individual systemi-
cally important firms will fail, Professor Rizwaan Jameel Mokal argues that 
trying to make the financial system stable by making it less likely that individ-
ual systemically important firms will fail can actually increase financial insta-
bility by ignoring the tendency of individual systemically important firms to try 
to externalize costs. Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, Liquidity, Systemic Risk, and the 
Bankruptcy Treatment of Financial Contracts, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. 
L. 15, 20, 68 (2015). In contrast, this Article’s proposal,—to require managers 
to account for systemic externalities in their governance decisions—confronts 
that tendency and has a clearly macroprudential goal: to reduce systemic risk. 
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A. BREAKING UP FIRMS AND LIMITING THEIR SIZE 
A commonly discussed TBTF-based regulatory approach is 
to break up systemically important firms and limit their size so 
they are no longer systemically important.69 But if, as this Arti-
cle argues,70 moral hazard does not cause systemically im-
portant firms to engage in excessively risky behavior, then this 
approach would not directly address risk-taking. 
Furthermore, this approach could be harmful: limiting firm 
size can undermine the economies of scale and scope that firms 
need to compete successfully in an increasingly globalized and 
interconnected world.71  
 
 69. See, e.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Board of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve, Speech at the Exchequer Club: Confronting Too Big To Fail (Oct. 1, 
2009), 2009 WL 3372545 at *6 (“Another approach would be to attack the big-
ness problem head-on by limiting the size or interconnectedness of financial in-
stitutions. Some observers have even suggested that existing large firms should 
be split up into smaller, not-too-big-to-fail entities, in a manner a bit reminis-
cent of the break-up of AT&T in the early 1980s.”); Marc R. Reinganum, Setting 
National Priorities: Financial Challenges Facing the Obama Administration, 65 
FIN. ANALYST J. 32, 34 (2009) (“In short, new policies should strive to make sure 
that no investment firm is too big to fail by either limiting the size of firms or 
prohibiting activities within a firm that can lead to failure.”); cf. Kashkari, su-
pra note 4, at 5 (outlining a number of possible “transformative” approaches to 
ending TBTF, including “[b]reaking up large banks into smaller, less connected, 
less important entities”). Kashkari also suggests “[t]urning large banks into 
public utilities by forcing them to hold so much capital that they virtually can’t 
fail . . .[and] taxing leverage throughout the financial system to reduce systemic 
risks wherever they lie.” Id. Another option is to implement alternative resolu-
tion mechanisms that could address some of the perceived shortcomings of cur-
rent resolution plans. Id. at 3. Cf. Joseph Lawler, Warren Introduces Glass-
Steagall Bill To Break up Big Banks, WASH. EXAMINER (July 7, 2015), http:// 
www.washingtonexaminer.com/warren-introduces-glass-steagall-bill-to-break 
-up-big-banks/article/2567757 (discussing ongoing political efforts to reduce the 
size of systemically important firms). This Article does not purport to examine 
whether breaking up systemically important firms could create a too many to 
fail problem if multiple broken-up firms face highly correlated risks. Cf. John 
C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need 
for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 801 (2011) 
(discussing those correlated risks). 
 70. See supra Part I (arguing that TBTF does not cause firms to engage in 
morally hazardous behavior) and Part II (arguing that excessive risk-taking re-
sults from externalized harm, not from reliance on a bailout). 
 71. Cf. Anna Kovner et al., Do Big Banks Have Lower Operating Costs?, 
FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 22 (2014) (“Consistent with recent 
research that identifies the presence of scale economies in banking, our results 
suggest that imposing size limits on banking firms would be likely to involve 
real economic costs. . . . [A] back-of-the-envelope calculation applied to our esti-
mates implies that limiting [bank holding company] size to be no larger than 
4 percent of GDP would increase total noninterest expense by $2 billion to 
$4 billion per quarter.”). 
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Large firms have many competitive advantages over smaller 
firms.72 As already mentioned, they can borrow at lower costs 
and have economies of scale.73 The latter include (1) brand-based 
economies of scale due to the ability of large firms to obtain 
brand recognition at lower cost;74 (2) cost-based economies of 
scale due to lower average cost per unit of output;75 (3) and rev-
enue-based economies of scale because financial service provid-
ers are more likely to advance them large loans and to under-
write large securities offerings.76 Similarly, large firms may 
benefit by offering a broad range of products or services to a large 
client base.77 Furthermore, in the increasingly global market of 
finance, larger financial firms can benefit by projecting a greater 
international presence and more easily offering cross-border fi-
nancial products.78 A TBTF-based regulatory approach that 
breaks up systemically important firms and limits their size 
would result in those firms losing out on these important ad-
vantages, and thus would be inefficient. 
Limiting firm size can also raise practical issues. For exam-
ple, it is unclear what metric should govern whether a firm is 
large enough that it should be broken up, especially for firms 
that are already relatively small but still pose a systemic risk.79 
Because it could limit profitability,80 any effort to break up firms 
 
 72. I am not advocating that firms be any larger, however, than needed to 
achieve economies of scale and scope and other appropriate benefits. Size can 
create its own problems, including potentially making a firm too big to properly 
manage. 
 73. See supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text. 
 74. Jean Dermine, European Banking: Past, Present, and Future, in THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM, 31, 57–58 (Vítor 
Gasper et al. eds., 2002). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id.; cf. Joseph P. Hughes & Loretta J. Mester, Who Said Large Banks 
Don’t Experience Scale Economies? Evidence from a Risk-Return-Driven Cost 
Function, 22 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 559, 561 (2013) (arguing that large banks 
have cost- and revenue-based economies of scale derived from their heightened 
risk-return tradeoff). 
 77. Dermine, supra note 74, at 29. Large firms even have defense-based 
economies of scale, because their size provides protection against takeover at-
tempts. Id. 
 78. Cf. Jean Dermine & Dirk Schoenmaker, In Banking, Is Small Beauti-
ful?, 19 FIN. MKTS., INSTS. & INSTRUMENTS 1, 7 (2010) (arguing that smaller 
banks are less competitive in international finance). 
 79. Gary H. Stern & Ron Feldman, Addressing TBTF by Shrinking Finan-
cial Institutions: An Initial Assessment, REGION (Fed. Reserve Bank of Minne-
apolis, Minneapolis, Minn.), June 2009, at 10, https://www.minneapolisfed.org/ 
~/media/files/pubs/region/09-06/shrinking.pdf. 
 80. See supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text. 
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is also likely to be unpopular among, and therefore opposed by, 
shareholders.81 
B. IMPOSING HIGHER CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 
Another TBTF-based approach to regulating excessive risk-
taking is to impose higher capital and other requirements on sys-
temically important firms.82 In the United States, for example, 
this is done by designating such firms as systemically important 
financial institutions, or SIFIs, which thereby subjects them to 
capital requirements set by the Federal Reserve.83 These capital 
requirements are based on the framework known as the Basel 
Accords, promulgated by the Basel Committee on Banking Su-
pervision under the auspices of the Bank for International Set-
tlements.84 
In response to the financial crisis, the Basel Committee is-
sued the Basel III recommendations, which are designed to fur-
ther strengthen bank capital requirements beyond those set in 
the Basel I and Basel II recommendations.85 The Federal Re-
serve’s minimum capital requirements are based on Basel III.86 
The Federal Reserve is also subjecting eight U.S.-based globally 
 
 81. Stern & Feldman, supra note 79, at 10. 
 82. Cf. Anat R. Admati, The Missed Opportunity and Challenge of Capital 
Regulation, NAT’L. INST. ECON. REV. No. 235, Feb. 2016, at R4 (“Capital regula-
tion is critical to address distortions and externalities from . . . the failure of 
markets to counter incentives for recklessness.”); Sanjai Bhagat et al., Size, Lev-
erage, and Risk-Taking of Financial Institutions, 59 J. BANKING & FIN. 520, 521 
(2015) (“[Our findings] suggest that instead of just limiting firm size, it may be 
more effective for regulators to strengthen and enhance regulations on equity 
capital requirements for all financial institutions.”). 
 83. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
12 U.S.C. § 5325(a)(1) (2012) (authorizing the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council to make recommendations to the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System on the “prudential standards and reporting and disclosure re-
quirements” of SIFIs). 
 84. See, e.g., Thomas L. Hogan & Neil R. Meredith, Risk and Risk-Based 
Capital of U.S. Bank Holding Companies, 49 J. REG. ECON. 86, 90 (2016), 
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11149-015-9289-8 (describing the Ba-
sel framework and measures specific to the United States). 
 85. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGU-
LATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 2, 56 
(2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf. 
 86. Hogan & Meredith, supra note 84, at 87. 
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systemically important banks (G-SIBs)87 to risk-based capital 
surcharges over and above the Basel III recommended level.88 
The ability of capital requirements to prevent risk-taking is 
unclear, however.89 Part of the articulated academic rationale 
for imposing capital requirements is that “[w]ith more capital, a 
large bank has more to lose if it goes under and, thus, has less 
incentives to take on risk.”90 But the more widely accepted gov-
ernment regulatory rationale for imposing capital requirements 
is to protect financial institutions against unexpected losses.91 
The Federal Reserve itself says the regulatory rationale is to en-
able banks and other financial firms to “hold adequate capital 
under adverse conditions to maintain ready access to funding, 
continue to serve as credit intermediaries, and continue opera-
tions.”92 The then-Chairman of the Financial Stability Board, 
 
 87. G-SIBs are banks whose collapse would threaten the entire interna-
tional financial system. Meraj Allahrakha et al., Systemic Importance Indica-
tors for 33 U.S. Bank Holding Companies: An Overview of Recent Data, OFF. 
FIN. RESEARCH BRIEF SERIES (Office of Financial Research), Feb. 12, 2015, at 
1. 
 88. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., (Dec. 9, 2014), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20141209a.htm. The 
surcharge, intended to become effective January 1, 2019, is to be calibrated 
based on each firm’s systemic risk profile. Id. 
 89. Cf. Alessio M. Pacces, The Future in Law & Finance 24 (Erasmus Univ. 
Rotterdam, Law Working Paper No. 217/2013, 2013) (observing that “higher 
capital requirements cannot stop banks from taking excessive risk”). 
 90. Mishkin et al., supra note 22, at 996 (“Higher capital requirements thus 
. . . make the too-big-to-fail problem less severe.”); cf. Anjan V. Thakor, Bank 
Capital and Financial Stability: An Economic Tradeoff or Faustian Bargain-
ing?, 6 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 185, 200 (2014) (observing that theories that em-
phasize the positive role of bank capital “rel[y] on the idea that the shareholders 
of better-capitalized banks have more to lose from bank failure and are there-
fore more likely to engage in costly borrower monitoring”); Hendrik Hakenes & 
Isabel Schnabel, Bank Size and Risk-Taking Under Basel II, 35 J. BANKING & 
FIN. 1436, 1437 n.5 (2011) (“Most of the existing [scholarly] literature focuses 
on moral hazard as the main motivation for capital requirements.”). 
 91. Kern Alexander & Steven L. Schwarcz, The Macroprudential Quan-
dary: Unsystematic Efforts To Reform Financial Regulation, in RECONCEPTUAL-
ISING GLOBAL FINANCE AND ITS REGULATION 127, 136 (Ross Buckley et al. eds., 
2016); cf. Admati, supra note 82, at R4 (“Well-designed capital regulation en-
sures that an appropriate part of funding is obtained and maintained from own-
ers and shareholders . . . [who] automatically absorb losses . . . .”); Hakenes & 
Schnabel, supra note 90, at 1437 n.5 (acknowledging that “[a]nother prominent 
explanation [for imposing capital requirements is to] buffer against losses”). 
 92. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Revised Temporary Adden-
dum to SR Letter 09-4: Dividend Increases and Other Capital Distributions for 
the 19 Supervisory Assessment Program Bank Holding Companies 1 (Nov. 17, 
2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2009/SR0904_ 
Addendum.pdf. 
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Mario Draghi, likewise articulated that regulatory rationale in 
2011.93 He also has explicitly questioned the ability of capital 
requirements to prevent risk-taking.94 
It therefore appears unsettled whether higher capital re-
quirements will discourage excessive risk-taking.95 Even mini-
mal discouragement might be beneficial, though, if there is no 
cost. Although certain economists argue that higher capital re-
quirements have no associated public costs,96 others argue to the 
contrary. Some fear that unintentionally excessive capital re-
quirements can lead to social costs.97 Others believe that capital 
requirements might reduce bank lending, thereby causing a 
credit shortfall that would harm the public.98 Still others criti-
cize capital requirements for cutting into global economic output 
 
 93. See Rainer Masera, Taking the Moral Hazard out of Banking: The Next 
Fundamental Step in Financial Reform, 64 PSL Q. REV. 105, 109 (2011) (“[The 
Chairman] . . . indicated that the new Basel III rules, aimed at strengthening 
banks’ capital buffers, were a positive step to help prevent future crises, by re-
ducing the probability of the failure of large banks.”). 
 94. Id. (stating that the Basel III capital requirements do “not address the 
moral hazard problem”). 
 95. But cf. text accompanying note 193, infra (arguing that whether or not 
higher capital requirements would discourage excessive risk-taking, they 
should be considered to make a systemically important firm’s insolvency less 
likely). 
 96. ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: 
WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 98 (2013); cf. Alberto 
Locarno, The Macroeconomic Impact of Basel III on the Italian Economy, QUES-
TIONI DI ECONOMIA E FINANZA No. 88, (Bank of Italy), Feb. 2011, at 21 (arguing 
in the context of the Italian economy that although the fall of output caused by 
new capital requirements will impose temporary costs, “the gains [will] un-
doubtedly outweigh the costs to be paid to achieve a sounder banking system”). 
 97. See, e.g., Jean Dermine, Bank Regulations After the Global Financial 
Crisis: Good Intentions and Unintended Evil, 19 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 658, 662 
(2013) (“Or, if capital is excessive, it might lead to inefficiently higher interest 
rates on bank loans . . . in a dynamic perspective, private costs may induce so-
cial costs as banks reduce their supply of loans or securitize assets.”). 
 98. See, e.g., Jacob Bikker & Haixa Hu, Cyclical Patterns in Profits, Provi-
sioning and Lending of Banks and Procyclicality of the New Basel Capital Re-
quirements, 55 BANCA NAZIONALE DEL LAVORO QUART. REV. 143, 144 (2002); 
Reint Gropp et al., Bank Response to Higher Capital Requirements: Evidence 
from a Quasi-Natural Experiment, (Sustainable Architecture for Fin. in Eur., 
Working Paper No. 156, 2016 https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/ 
148361/1/874406994.pdf (finding that higher bank capital requirements cause 
banks to increase their capital ratios not by raising their levels of equity but by 
reducing their credit supply, resulting in lower firm, investment, and sales 
growth); cf. David Bholat, Money, Bank Debt, and Business Cycles: Between Eco-
nomic Development and Financial Crises, in AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT AND SE-
CURED TRANSACTIONS IN A TIME OF CRISIS 28 (N. Orkun Akseli ed., 2013) (dis-
cussing theory that a contraction in bank lending results in declining economic 
output, unemployment, and a recession or even depression). 
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and reducing jobs.99 One financial economist recently claimed 
that higher capital requirements can create “uncertainty [that] 
severely undermines rather than reinforces market discipline” 
because “the Basel [III] system of risk weights” is “excessively 
complex and highly difficult to understand [and also] suscep-
tib[le] to gaming.”100 That uncertainty, he further contends, “will 
lead to a near certain loss of confidence in the banking system” 
in the event of a crisis.101 
Furthermore, the misapplication of capital requirements 
could have a substantial cost. Capital requirements are gener-
ally imposed on a countercyclical basis.102 This recognizes that 
finance, and especially banking, is by nature procyclical.103 Low-
ering capital requirements can stimulate economic growth, 
whereas increasing capital requirements can help to discourage 
the buildup of imbalances during economic booms and bub-
bles.104 There has been debate, however, about whether counter-
cyclical regulation is actually feasible given that it is virtually 
 
 99. See Eduardo Porter, Recession’s True Cost Is Still Being Tallied, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/22/business/economy/ 
the-cost-of-the-financial-crisis-is-still-being-tallied.html (discussing these criti-
cisms of capital requirements). 
 100. Emilios Avgouleas, Bank Leverage Ratios and Financial Stability: A 
Micro- and Macroprudential Perspective, 16–17 (Levy Econ. Inst. Working Pa-
per No. 849, 2015). 
 101. Id. at 17. 
 102. See Kristin N. Johnson, Macroprudential Regulation: A Sustainable Ap-
proach To Regulating Financial Markets, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 904, 916 
(2013) (discussing flexible capital requirements as a macroprudential tool); 
Richard Berner, Dir. of Office of Fin. Research, Remarks at the Joint Conference 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and Office of Financial Research, Fi-
nancial Stability Analysis: Using the Tools, Finding the Data (May 30, 2013) 
(identifying countercyclical capital requirements as a tool to reduce or neutral-
ize “threats to financial stability”). 
 103. See Haocong Ren, Countercyclical Financial Regulation 3 (World Bank, 
Working Paper No. 5823, 2011), http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/ 
10.1596/1813-9450-5823 (observing that during economic booms and bubbles, 
credit expansion outpaces economic growth, and that during economic down-
turns, lending contracts further worsen economic prospects). 
 104. See Brett H. McDonnell, Designing Countercyclical Capital Buffers, 18 
N.C. BANKING INST. 123, 123 (2013) (noting that the same factors that cause 
cycles in the financial markets cause financial regulations to reinforce the cy-
cles); see also id. at 124–30 (discussing how capital requirements are procyclical 
when they force banks to cut back on lending due to faltering capital positions 
because of decreasing credit quality and increasing losses, further deteriorating 
economic performance and resulting in even more credit losses). 
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impossible to know ex ante whether a financial cycle is rational 
or merely a bubble.105 
Yet, accuracy is critical; the mistiming or misapplication of 
countercyclical regulation can be devastating, as illustrated by 
the savings and loan (S&L) crisis of the 1980s in the United 
States. S&L institutions faced a period in which rising interest 
rates made lending less attractive to borrowers.106 To avoid hav-
ing to commit government funds to bail out financially stressed 
institutions, regulators relieved the stress by engaging in a type 
of countercyclicality: they eased the capital ratios in order to 
“help troubled banks muddle through [that] difficult period[.]”107 
However, the result of that forbearance, in conjunction with 
other regulatory-relief steps, was the rapid expansion of the size 
of the S&L industry—from $686 billion in 1982 to $1.1 trillion in 
1985.108 When the S&L industry eventually collapsed, its in-
creased size led to the largest federal bailout in history up to that 
time.109 
During the writing of this Article, the Minneapolis Fed is-
sued a comment draft of its Plan [T]o End Too Big [T]o Fail.110 
The Plan focuses on dramatically increasing capital for all large 
systemically important firms, and then forcing firms that are 
still TBTF to “restructure themselves” or issue so much capital 
 
 105. See, e.g., Patricia A. McCoy, Countercyclical Regulation and Its Chal-
lenges 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1181, 1220 (2015) (observing that a primary prerequisite 
to feasible countercyclical regulation is extensive data and information); 
MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL 
REGULATION 11, 18 (2009) (criticizing countercyclical capital buffers as being 
difficult to implement, easy to circumvent, and subject to regulatory arbitrage). 
Countercyclical regulation’s effectiveness could be further undermined by reg-
ulatory arbitrage if the measures are not analogously applied to relevant 
shadow-banking activities. Ren, supra note 103, at 8. 
 106. Douglas J. Elliott et al., The History of Cyclical Macroprudential Policy 
in the United States, in FINANCE AND ECONOMICS DISCUSSION SERIES NO. 2013-
29, 34 (Fed. Reserve Bd., 2013), https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2013/ 
201329/201329pap.pdf. 
 107. Id. (observing that this countercyclicality was imprecisely imple-
mented). 
 108. Id. at 35. 
 109. See Lawrence A. Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or Four Ap-
proaches to Financial Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in 
Crisis Response, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 39, 51–52 (2009). 
 110. FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, THE MINNEAPOLIS PLAN TO END 
TOO BIG TO FAIL (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/~/media/files/ 
publications/studies/endingtbtf/the-minneapolis-plan-to-end-too-big-to-fail 
-2016.pdf. 
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that they “virtually cannot fail.”111 Annex 2 to this Article sets 
forth the author’s comments on that draft plan.  
C. CONVERTING DEBT TO EQUITY  
This approach—which includes the total loss-absorbing ca-
pacity (TLAC) proposal112—seeks to pre-engineer a change to a 
systemically important firm’s capital structure that is triggered 
if the firm experiences financial problems. Thus the Minneapolis 
Fed has considered TBTF-based regulation that would convert 
certain debt claims into equity interests if and when a systemi-
cally important firm reaches a specified level of financial deteri-
oration.113 The debt-to-equity conversion of the securities evi-
dencing these debt claims (called contingent convertible 
securities, or “CoCos”) would not bring new cash into the firm.114 
Instead, it would reduce the firm’s indebtedness, thereby mak-
ing the firm financially viable again.115 The possibility that their 
 
 111. Press Release, Neel Kashkari, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Minne-
apolis, Neel Kashkari Presents the Minneapolis Plan to End Too Big to Fail 
(Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/~/media/files/publications/ 
studies/endingtbtf/the-minneapolis-plan/remarks-to-econ-club-of-ny.pdf. 
 112. Erica Jeffrey, TLAC: What You Should Know, EUROMONEY (Aug. 10, 
2016), https://www.euromoney.com/article/b12kl97jn3mk69/tlac-what-you 
-should-know (discussing how TLAC contemplates that systemically important 
firms issue minimum levels of debt and similar securities “that can be written 
down or converted into equity in case of resolution[.]”);see also Total Loss-Ab-
sorbing Capacity, Long-Term Debt, and Clean Holding Company Requirements 
for Systemically Important U.S. Bank Holding Companies and Intermediate 
Holding Companies of Systemically Important Foreign Banking Organizations, 
80 Fed. Reg. 74926 (proposed Nov. 30, 2015); Press Release, Fed. Reserve. Bd., 
Federal Reserve Board Proposes New Rule To Strengthen the Ability of Largest 
Domestic and Foreign Banks Operating in the United States To Be Resolved 
Without Extraordinary Government Support or Taxpayer Assistance (Oct. 30, 
2015), http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20151030a 
.htm. 
 113. See Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, The Fourth Symposium on End-
ing Too Big To Fail, September 26, https://www.minneapolisfed.org/ 
publications/special-studies/endingtbtf/symposiums/ending-too-big-to-fail 
-symposium-iv (last visited Nov. 6, 2017); see also Tom Beardsworth & John 
Glover, Contingent Convertibles: High-Yield Hand Grenades, BLOOMBERG: 
QUICKTAKE (July 29, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/contingent 
-convertible-bonds. 
 114. Edward Simpson Prescott, Contingent Capital: The Trigger Problem, 98 
ECON. Q. 33, 34 n.3 (2012). 
 115. Jianping Zhu et al., From Bail-out to Bail-in: Mandatory Debt Restruc-
turing of Systemic Financial Institutions, IMF STAFF DISCUSSION NOTE, 
SDN/12/03, 14 (Apr. 24, 2012), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2012/ 
sdn1203.pdf. 
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debt could be converted into equity should also motivate credi-
tors to take on more of a “monitoring” role,116 which could reduce 
the firm’s risk-taking. 
CoCos have been issued in Europe, where the initial tests of 
their conversion have had mixed success. In early June 2017, the 
junior-bond CoCos of Spain’s Banco Popular converted as 
planned to prevent the bank’s failure.117 Later that month, in 
contrast, the senior-bond CoCos of Italy’s Veneto Banca and 
Banca Popolare di Vicenza were not converted, resulting in a 
taxpayer bailout of those banks.118 Although there are ways to 
try to distinguish these cases,119 some argue they reflect the in-
evitable failure of CoCos as a viable resolution option.120 Thus, 
the effectiveness of CoCos in reducing excessive risk-taking re-
mains uncertain. There are also questions remaining regarding 
the actual implementation of such a CoCo conversion in the 
United States, including what would trigger the debt to con-
vert121 and how to ensure that creditors holding convertible debt 
are compensated without making the debt too costly.122 
 
 116. Emilios Avgouleas & Charles Goodhart, Critical Reflections on Bank 
Bail-Ins, 1 J. FIN. REG. 3, 4–5 (2015). 
 117. Senior Moment: Europe’s Framework for Dealing with Troubled Banks 
Is Working, But Has One Big Drawback, ECONOMIST, July 1, 2017, at 14. 
 118. Id. 
 119. For example, the new European agency in charge of bank resolution, 
the Single Resolution Board (SRB), apparently determined that the Italian 
banks “did not pose a threat to financial stability, and handed them to the Ital-
ian authorities to deal with under national insolvency procedures[.]” Id. Alt-
hough there is no evidence of this, the SRB might also have been more reluctant 
to convert senior than junior bonds. 
 120. See, e.g., Neel Kashkari, New Bailouts Prove ‘Too Big To Fail’ Is Alive 
and Well, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2017, at A17 (arguing that the Italian bank 
bailouts prove that “‘bail-in debt’ doesn’t prevent bailouts”). Kashkari contends 
that CoCos won’t work because governments “fear financial contagion” if they 
“force losses on bondholders.” Id. Where systemic risk isn’t at issue, he main-
tains that CoCos won’t work because “governments may worry that bondholders 
are politically important constituents.” Id. Professor Admati likewise argues 
that it “is unrealistic to expect that regulators will trigger recovery and resolu-
tion processes that are complex, costly and untested so that losses can be im-
posed on debt-like TLAC securities, and that they would be politically able to 
follow up with imposing losses on creditors’ mandatory conversion to equity. 
This is particularly true if a potential crisis is looming, since pulling triggers 
and inflicting haircuts might have unpredictable consequences throughout the 
opaque financial system.” Admati, supra note 82, at R10. 
 121. See Emilios Avgouleas et al., Living Wills as a Catalyst for Action, DUI-
SENBERG SCH. OF FIN. POL’Y PAPER NO. 4, 4 (2010). 
 122. Eric S. Halperin, CoCo Rising: Can the Emergence of Novel Hybrid Se-
curities Protect from Future Liquidity Crises?, 8 BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 15, 
21–23 (2011) (explaining why issuing CoCos to investors may be more expensive 
 2017] TOO BIG TO FOOL 783 
 
CoCos can also raise their own moral hazard concern. Po-
tentially, a “bank that issues contingent capital faces a moral 
hazard incentive to increase its assets’ jump risks”—that is, the 
risk that bank assets can suffer large, sudden losses.123 In other 
words, issuers of CoCos may be motivated to invest in risky as-
sets because such issuers will be protected against a fall in asset 
value by the CoCos’ debt-to-equity conversion. Attempts to re-
duce this moral hazard, such as including restrictive contractual 
covenants, can be overly rigid and “impair[] the managers’ abil-
ity to pursue value-maximizing projects.”124 The failure to re-
duce this moral hazard is likely to further increase the cost of 
issuing CoCos.125 President Kashkari himself appears to be 
skeptical of this approach.126 The Financial Stability Board, 
however, has made this approach a significant part of its plans 
to end TBTF.127 
D. CONTROLLING FAILURE TO REDUCE MORAL HAZARD AND THE 
NEED FOR A BAILOUT  
The final approach focuses on controlling the failure of a sys-
temically important firm, in order to reduce moral hazard and 
the need for a bailout. In the United States, for example, the 
Dodd-Frank Act restricts the Federal Reserve’s authority to act 
as a lender of last resort to provide bailouts to failing financial 
institutions.128 This restriction is primarily intended to reduce 
 
than issuing ordinary debt); Paul Melaschenko & Noel Reynolds, A Template 
for Recapitalising Too-Big-To-Fail Banks, BIS Q. REV. 25, 34–35 (June 2013).  
 123. George Pennacchi, A Structural Model of Contingent Bank Capital 28 
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 10-04, 2010), https://www 
.moodys.com/microsites/crc2010/papers/pennacchi_concap.pdf 
 124. Simone M. Sepe, Corporate Agency Problems and ‘Dequity’ Contracts, 
36 J. CORP. L. 113, 145 (2010). Another concern over this moral hazard is that 
it will increase the cost of CoCos. 
 125. Cf. Pennacchi, supra note 123, at 22 (arguing that investors in CoCos 
that are subject to “downward jumps in value” will “demand higher new issue 
yields to compensate for these potential losses”). 
 126. Kashkari, supra note 4. 
 127. See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 15, at 8 (“Much has now been done 
to achieve what is necessary to make too-big-to-fail banks resolvable. A partic-
ular milestone was the FSB’s publication in November 2015 of the finalised 
standard for Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC). This policy taken together 
with the other policy measures to enhance the resolvability of systemic banks 
will, if implemented at firm level and underpinned by robust legal or regulatory 
measures, contribute to greater resilience of the financial system.”) (internal 
citation omitted). 
 128. The Dodd-Frank Act limits the authority of the Federal Reserve to 
make emergency loans under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. Dodd-
Frank amended that subsection to require the Federal Reserve to consult with 
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the moral hazard of systemically important firms by removing 
their expectation of a financial safety net should risky behavior 
put such a firm at risk of failing.129  
Again, however, if moral hazard does not cause those firms 
to engage in excessively risky behavior,130 then this restriction 
cannot, by itself, prevent such behavior. Also, this restriction is 
dangerous,131 making it much more likely that the government 
will be unable to prevent systemically important firms from fail-
ing, with (predictably) systemically devastating conse-
quences.132 
Planning ahead may also be ineffective to control failure. 
The Dodd-Frank Act also requires certain systemically im-
portant firms to file so-called living wills, which are resolution 
plans setting forth how they could liquidate with minimal sys-
temic impact.133 This is intended to reduce the need for a 
 
and receive approval from the Secretary of the Treasury to ensure that any 
emergency lending is designed to provide liquidity to the markets and not to aid 
a financially failing firm. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1101(a)(6), 124 Stat. 2113, 2113–15 (2010). 
 129. See, e.g., Norbert J. Michel, Title XI Does Not End Federal Reserve 
Bailouts, in THE CASE AGAINST DODD-FRANK: HOW THE “CONSUMER PROTEC-
TION” LAW ENDANGERS AMERICANS 169, 170 (Norbert J. Michel ed., 2016) (“One 
concern with central banks providing direct loans is a basic moral hazard prob-
lem. Namely, if central banks provide liberal credit to private banks (or other 
private firms) on a regular basis, the knowledge of having easy access to these 
loans would likely encourage private companies to take on additional risk.”). 
 130. See supra notes 22–31 and accompanying text. 
 131. Indeed, the restriction is counter to the European Union’s efforts to ex-
pand central bank authority to act as a lender of last resort to failing financial 
institutions. Carlos Garcia-de-Andoain et al., Lending-of-Last-Resort Is as 
Lending-of-Last-Resort Does: Central Bank Liquidity Provision and Interbank 
Market Functioning in the Euro Area, 1 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 32 (2016). 
 132. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic 
Risk: Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1376–
80 (2011); Coffee, supra note 9, at 825 (observing that the Dodd-Frank Act pre-
vents federal government lender-of-last-resort assistance to nonbank financial 
firms that are solvent but illiquid, thereby forcing “some firms into an arguably 
unnecessary liquidation”); Michael Fleming & Asani Sarkar, The Failure Reso-
lution of Lehman Brothers, 20 FED. RESERVE BD. N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 175, 
178 (2014) (observing that the Dodd-Frank Act’s “circumscrib[ing] the ability of 
the Fed[eral Reserve] to act as lender of last resort to the same extent that it 
did during the financial crisis” will virtually assure that the future bankruptcy 
of a systemically important firm will result in high creditor losses). 
 133. See, e.g., Jennifer Meyerowitz & Joseph N. Wharton, A Dodd-Frank 
Living Wills Primer: What You Need To Know Now, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 34, 
34 (Aug. 2012) (“As part of the goal to remove the risks to the financial system 
posed by ‘too big to fail’ institutions, § 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act requires 
‘systemically important financial institutions’ to create ‘living wills’ to facilitate 
‘rapid and orderly resolution,[sic] in the event of material financial distress or 
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bailout.134 The living-will requirement might not, however, elim-
inate that need.135 In my many years as a workout and bank-
ruptcy lawyer, I rarely saw a firm’s failure that accurately re-
flected, much less closely resembled, expectations about the firm 
when it was profitable. Furthermore, living wills do not prevent 
the concurrent failure of multiple otherwise-systemically im-
portant firms from collectively having a systemic impact.136 The 
financial crisis demonstrated that a concurrence of failures is 
likely when the causes of the failures are interconnected, such 
as an industry-wide overreliance on credit ratings.137 
The so-called single-point-of-entry (SPOE) strategy repre-
sents another way to attempt to control the failure of a systemi-
cally important firm in order to reduce the need for a public 
bailout.138 This strategy is artificially dependent on systemically 
important firms having a parent-subsidiary organizational 
structure in which the parent holds the stock of the operating-
company subsidiary.139 At the start, therefore, it faces unique 
legal challenges for cross-border systemically important firms, 
which may not have the parent-subsidiary structure needed for 
the strategy’s execution. 
 
failure.’” (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d) (2012))). 
 134. See Clay R. Costner, Comment, Living Wills: Can a Flexible Approach 
to Rulemaking Address Key Concerns Surrounding Dodd-Frank’s Resolution 
Plans?, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 133, 138–40 (2012) (summarizing arguments for 
how living wills might help address TBTF). 
 135. Although it is questionable, as discussed, whether the U.S. government 
could satisfy such a need if it arises. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 136. Cf. Victoria McGrane, FDIC Chief: Big Failure Won’t Harm the System, 
WALL ST. J., May 12, 2015, at C1 (observing that some in Congress “doubt reg-
ulators could handle the failure of multiple major firms at the same time”). 
 137. Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the 
Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 379–83 (2008); id. at 404–
05. Cf. Janet L. Yellen, Vice-Chair of Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Speech at the Annual Meeting of the National Association for Business Econom-
ics, Denver, Col. (Oct. 11, 2010), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
speech/yellen20101011a.pdf (attributing the financial crisis to concurrences of 
interrelated failures). 
 138. See, e.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Board of Governors of the U.S. 
Fed. Reserve Board, Toward Building a More Effective Resolution Regime: Pro-
gress and Challenges, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Board and Federal Re-
serve Bank of Richmond Conference (Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.federalreserve 
.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20131018a.pdf (“The aim of the single-point-of-
entry approach is to stabilize the failed firm quickly, in order to mitigate the 
negative impact on the U.S. financial system, and to do so without supporting 
the firm’s equity holders and other capital liabilities holders or exposing U.S. 
taxpayers to losses.”). 
 139. John Crawford, “Single Point of Entry”: The Promise and Limits of the 
Latest Cure for Bailouts, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 103, 107 (2014). 
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Under the SPOE strategy, if the subsidiary begins to fail, a 
government agency (in the United States, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation) becomes the receiver of the parent,140 
wiping out the parent-company’s shareholders (and potentially 
writing down some of its debt).141 The receiver then may provide 
temporary liquidity to the parent to keep the subsidiary operat-
ing (and thereby avoiding the instability that rocked the finan-
cial markets after Lehman Brothers collapsed142), while it seeks 
to sell its receivership interest to equity investors to bring in 
more permanent capital.143 Although proponents of the SPOE 
strategy are optimistic it can work once implementation chal-
lenges are resolved,144 others—including Kashkari145—believe 
the strategy is unlikely to be practical.146 
Part III has shown that the TBTF-based approaches to reg-
ulating excessive risk-taking are inadequate. As next explained, 
such risk-taking should be more directly regulated. 
 
 140. Mechanically, the steps described above might take place through a 
bridge company. The above-simplified description nonetheless would still accu-
rately depict the economics of the SPOE strategy. 
 141. See, e.g., Jerome H. Powell, Governor, Fed. Reserve Board of Governors, 
Ending “Too Big To Fail”, Remarks at the Institute of International Bankers 
2013 Washington Conference, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 14, 2013), https://www 
.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/powell20130304a.pdf. 
 142. Kwon-Yong Jin, How To Eat an Elephant: Corporate Group Structure 
of Systemically Important Financial Institutions, Orderly Liquidation Author-
ity, and Single Point of Entry Resolution, 124 YALE L.J. 1746, 1764 (2015). 
 143. Powell, supra note 141. 
 144. Jeremy C. Stein, Regulating Large Financial Institutions, in WHAT 
HAVE WE LEARNED?: MACROECONOMIC POLICY AFTER THE CRISIS 135 (George 
Akerlof et al. eds., 2014). 
 145. Kashkari, supra note 4 (observing that there is no way to test this strat-
egy’s effectiveness until it is actually in use, and doubting it will be useful in a 
stressed economic climate). 
 146. See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big and 
Unable To Fail, (George Washington Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Paper 
No. 2016-44, 2016) (describing single point of entry as “a resolution tool de-
signed for a very stylized, even hypothetical sort of failure”); cf. Emilios Avgou-
leas & Charles Goodhart, A Critical Evaluation of Bail-ins as a Bank Recapital-
isation Mechanism, Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper 
10065, 18 (2014) (arguing that “[r]eputational contagion” may cause investor 
flight once the holding company is liquidated, regardless of how many subsidi-
aries are still operating); Paul H. Kupiec & Peter J. Wallison, Can the “Single 
Point of Entry” Strategy Be Used To Recapitalize a Failing Bank?, (Am. Enter-
prise Inst. Econ., Working Paper No. 2014-08, 2014) (discussing the possibility 
that the FDIC may have to borrow from the U.S. Treasury to recapitalize sub-
sidiaries, and expressing concern that Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act prohibits 
bank-subsidiary recapitalization using such funds; also observing that if the use 
of the funds are challenged, the losses are likely to fall on taxpayers). 
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IV.  EXCESSIVE RISK-TAKING SHOULD BE MORE 
DIRECTLY REGULATED   
If this Article is correct that systemically important firms 
are more likely to engage in excessive risk-taking because much 
of the systemic harm from their failure would be externalized 
onto the public,147 regulation should require those firms to inter-
nalize systemic externalities. Section A shows how corporate 
governance law could accomplish that, without unduly weaken-
ing corporate wealth-producing capacity, by mandating a public 
governance duty to help realign private and public interests.148 
Section B thereafter addresses the problem that, notwithstand-
ing a perfect realignment of private and public interests, a sys-
temically important firm could still be subject to failure. An ex-
ogenous shock, for example, might cause the failure.149 Avoiding 
that failure could impose bailout costs on the public. Section B 
argues for the creation of a privatized fund to minimize those 
bailout costs. 
This proposed realignment of private and public interests 
under a public governance duty is fundamentally different from, 
and should not be confused with, the regulatory responses to the 
financial crisis that attempt to mitigate excessive risk-taking by 
aligning managerial and investor interests.150 Those types of re-
sponses are necessary but insufficient: even if managerial and 
 
 147. See supra Part II. Recall that corporate governance law requires man-
agers to view the consequences of their firm’s actions, and thus to view the ex-
pected value of corporate risk-taking, from the standpoint of the firm and its 
investors. This ignores public externalities caused by the actions. Although that 
generally makes sense, it does not make sense for risk-taking by systemically 
important firms that can cause systemic externalities that damage the economy 
and harm the public. 
 148. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision also advocates revising 
corporate governance for banks, but so far its principles merely require manag-
ers to “look after the interests of the bank as a whole” and do not require them 
to take into account the possibility of systemic externalities. See BASEL COMM. 
ON BANKING SUPERVISION, GUIDELINES: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 
FOR BANKS (2015), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d328.pdf. 
 149. Cf. Dam & Koetter, supra note 24, at 2344 (“Even a prudently managed 
bank might be distressed because of an exogenous shock.”). 
 150. For example, requiring a systemically important firm to tie manage-
ment compensation to the firm’s long-term performance is intended to better 
align managerial and investor interests by penalizing managers who engage 
such firms in risky ventures that, notwithstanding short-term appeal, ulti-
mately jeopardize investors. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay-
ing for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1915 (2010); cf. Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Manage-
ment Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457 (2009) (arguing that aligning sec-
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investor interests to engage in risk-taking could be perfectly 
aligned, that would not control the systemic externalities that 
result from a misalignment of interests between the private sec-
tor—the firm and its managers and investors—and the public 
sector.151 
A. REGULATING GOVERNANCE 
As explained in Part II, excessive corporate risk-taking is 
essentially a corporate governance problem. Much of the harm 
from a systemically important firm’s failure would be external-
ized onto the public, but corporate governance law does not re-
quire managers to consider those externalities. As a result, sys-
temically important firms “lack sufficient incentives to take 
precautions against their own failures.”152 
Requiring managers of systemically important firms to ac-
count for systemic externalities in their governance decisions 
would help to correct this misalignment between private and 
public interests. That, in turn, would help to reduce excessive 
risk-taking. To this end, I have separately argued that managers 
of systemically important firms should have a duty to society (a 
“public governance duty”) not to engage their firms in excessive 
risk-taking that leads to systemic externalities.153 I also have 
analyzed in detail how to create a public governance duty with-
out unduly weakening corporate wealth-producing capacity.154 
The remaining discussion in this Section A draws from, and is 
more fully informed by, that analysis.155  
 
ondary and senior managerial interests can help to mitigate excessive risk-tak-
ing). 
 151. For a detailed analysis of why attempts to mitigate excessive risk-tak-
ing by aligning managerial and investor interests are insufficient, see Misalign-
ment, supra note 50, at 7–8. 
 152. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., CALIBRATING THE GSIB 
SURCHARGE 1 (July 20, 2015). 
 153. See Misalignment, supra note 50. Although a public governance duty 
could be judicially created, I have argued that it should be enacted legislatively 
because it broadly impacts public policy. In the United States, for example, this 
would mean that a public governance duty should be imposed either by state 
legislatures (especially the Delaware legislature, because most domestic firms 
are incorporated under Delaware law) or by the U.S. Congress. Id. at 29–31. 
 154. See id. at 28–50. 
 155. To add some real-world perspective, it should be recognized that there 
is precedent for altering corporate governance in light of public concerns. It is 
done all the time, for example, to address national security concerns. Cf. Andrew 
Verstein, The Corporate Governance of National Security, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) (discussing the “hundreds of companies” at which the federal 
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Two critical questions arise in designing a corporate govern-
ance plan to reduce excessive risk-taking: how should a system-
ically important firm’s managers assess and balance the public 
costs and private benefits of a risk-taking activity; and how 
should the business judgment rule apply to their decisionmak-
ing? 
1. Assessing and Balancing Costs and Benefits  
How should managers of a systemically important firm, or 
members of its risk committee,156 assess and balance the public 
costs and private benefits of a risk-taking activity? Compare two 
approaches, one subjective and the other more objective and 
ministerial. To minimize the burden on managers, these ap-
proaches would be needed only when deciding on a risky project 
whose failure might, either itself or in combination with other 
factors, cause the firm to fail.157 That limitation on using the ap-
proaches recognizes that systemic externalities would most 
likely result from such a failure.158  
Under the subjective approach, managers would simply con-
sider and balance the public costs and private benefits of engag-
ing in the project the same way they would consider and balance 
any other relevant costs and benefits when making a corporate 
governance decision.159 Although managers might favor this ap-
proach, it would have several drawbacks. Most significantly, 
such a decision-making process should be more publicly trans-
parent because the consequences of a systemic collapse can be 
 
government installs designees “to run the business without shareholder over-
sight, putting [national] security before profits”).  
 156. For example, section 165(h) of the Dodd-Frank Act directs the Federal 
Reserve Board to require each publicly traded nonbank financial company su-
pervised by the Board and each publicly traded bank holding company with to-
tal consolidated assets of ten billion dollars or more to establish a risk commit-
tee, which will be responsible for overseeing the company’s risk-management 
practices. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(h) (2012). However, the Board’s implementing regu-
lations currently only require risk committees to focus on risks to the firm, not 
to the public. 12 C.F.R. § 252.20–35 (2017); cf. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SU-
PERVISION, supra note 148 (observing that the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision’s governance principles do not require bank managers to consider 
systemic externalities). 
 157. In making these decisions, I have suggested that managers should be 
able to choose on a case-by-case basis whether to follow the subjective or objec-
tive approach. Misalignment, supra note 50, at 32. 
 158. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 159. Misalignment, supra note 50, at 32. 
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devastating to the public. Managers following a subjective ap-
proach may also be subject to peer pressure to favor investor 
profitability over avoiding public harm.160 
The objective approach would be much more transparent 
about how the public costs and private benefits are assessed and 
balanced. Managers considering engaging in the project would 
measure the public costs by the expected value of the project’s 
systemic costs and would measure the private benefits by the 
expected value of the project to the firm’s shareholders.161 With 
one exception—valuing the systemic costs if the firm fails—those 
managers should have sufficient information, or at least much 
more information than third parties, about these values.162 
Valuing the systemic costs if the firm fails should be a public 
policy choice. It might be based, for example, on the estimated 
cost of a government bailout to avoid a systemic failure. Such an 
estimate could be made by the government as part of the process 
of designating a firm as systemically important, and thereafter 
periodically updated by the government.163 
Under the objective and more ministerial approach, manag-
ers could simply use the expected value calculations to balance 
the public costs and private benefits of engaging in the project. 
From a Kaldor-Hicks economic efficiency standpoint,164 the pro-
ject’s justification would turn on the higher expected value. But 
strict economic efficiency may be insufficient as a public policy 
matter because the magnitude and harmful consequences of a 
systemic collapse, if it occurs, could be devastating. It therefore 
may be appropriate to apply a precautionary principle, requiring 
a margin of safety in the balancing.165 Even if this margin-of-
safety requirement reduces a firm’s wealth production from a 
given project that is not undertaken, the net wealth production 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 33. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See id. at 33–34. 
 164. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion, under which the aggregate benefits exceed 
the aggregate costs (even if those who benefit are not required to compensate 
those who are harmed), sets the operating standard of efficiency. See, e.g., RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2, at 13–14 (4th ed. 1992); 
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
961, 1015 (2001). 
 165. Misalignment, supra note 50, at 35–36; cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the 
Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1014 (2003) (discussing a pre-
cautionary principle under which “[r]egulation should include a margin of 
safety, limiting activities below the level at which adverse effects have not been 
found or predicted”). 
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to society, after subtracting systemic costs, should be in-
creased.166  
2. Applying the Business Judgment Rule  
How should the business judgment rule apply to a public 
governance duty? In the traditional corporate governance con-
text, managers are protected by this rule, which presumes that 
they should not be personally liable for harm caused by negligent 
decisions made in good faith and without conflicts of interest—
and in some articulations of the business judgment rule, also 
without gross negligence.167 The rule attempts to balance the 
goal of protecting investors against losses with the goals of en-
couraging the best managers to serve168 and avoiding the exer-
cise of inappropriate judicial second-guessing.169 
Arguably, the business judgment rule should apply differ-
ently to a public governance duty because one of the rule’s basic 
assumptions—that there be no conflict of interest—may be 
breached. The interest of a manager who holds significant shares 
or interests in shares, or whose compensation or retention is de-
pendent on share price, is aligned with the firm’s shareholders, 
not with that of the public. To that extent, the manager would 
have a conflict of interest.170 To address that conflict, conflicted 
managers who are grossly negligent—that is, who fail to use 
even slight care in assessing systemic harm to the public—could 
be barred from using the rule as a defense. Even with that bar, 
managers who follow a reasonable procedure171 to balance public 
 
 166. Misalignment, supra note 50, at 37. 
 167. Hurt, supra note 46, at 258–59. 
 168. See, e.g., Ryan Scarborough & Richard Olderman, Why Does the FDIC 
Sue Bank Officers? Exploring the Boundaries of the Business Judgment Rule in 
the Wake of the Great Recession, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 367, 376–77 
(2015). 
 169. Robert T. Miller, Oversight Liability for Risk-Management Failures at 
Financial Firms, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 120–21 (2010); see also Hurt, supra note 
46, at 259–60. 
 170. Misalignment, supra note 50, at 42. 
 171. The business judgment rule generally respects a duty of process or care, 
which is the standard commonly used in the United States. See, e.g., Brehm v. 
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (stating that due care in the corporate 
decision-making context is process due care only, not substantive due care); In 
re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–68 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(“[T]he business judgment rule is process oriented and informed by a deep re-
spect for all good faith board decisions.”). 
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costs and private benefits would be using (at least) slight care 
and therefore should be protected.172 
B. MINIMIZING BAILOUT COSTS 
Section A has shown how regulating the governance of sys-
temically important firms could control excessive risk-taking. 
Nonetheless, such a firm could still fail because that control was 
imperfect or for exogenous reasons. Avoiding that failure could 
impose bailout costs on the public.173 This Section discusses how 
to minimize those bailout costs. 
Government central banks traditionally are tasked with 
helping to bail out critical banks, to prevent them from default-
ing. They appear to perform this task well,174 subject only to con-
cerns over whether such measures impose bailout costs on tax-
payers and whether bailouts create moral hazard.175 Both of 
those concerns could be addressed by privatizing the bailout cost. 
Privatization could be implemented, for example, by taxing 
systemically important firms to create a bailout fund.176 In the 
United States, there are analogous precedents for requiring the 
private sector to contribute funds to help internalize externali-
ties.177 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation requires 
 
 172. Misalignment, supra note 50, at 42–43. 
 173. See supra notes 3 and 6. In the United States, however, the experience 
of the financial crisis is that the net cost of bailing out systemically important 
firms has been relatively minimal, with the government recouping much of its 
investment. See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman, U.S. Declares Bank and Auto Bailouts 
Over, and Profitable, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2014, at B1. 
 174. See Gary Gorton & Lixin Huang, Liquidity, Efficiency, and Bank 
Bailouts, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 455, 473–74 (2004). 
 175. Cf. supra Part III.D (discussing those concerns). 
 176. See Systemic Risk, supra note 53, at 226 (proposing this approach to 
privatize bailout costs of systemically important firms); cf. Jeffrey N. Gordon & 
Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s Dangers and 
the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151, 
156 (2011) (calling for a systemic emergency insurance fund that is funded by 
the financial industry); Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 1015–22 (arguing that sys-
temically important firms should be required to pay risk-based insurance pre-
miums which would be used to fund liquidation of failed firms and thus reduce 
potential bailout costs). 
 177. The externalities in our case would, of course, be bailout costs. Ironi-
cally, an earlier version of the Dodd-Frank Act included a provision for a privat-
ized bailout fund sourced by large banks and other systemically important fi-
nancial institutions. See Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 
3217, 111th Cong. § 210(n) (2010). This provision was dropped, however, after 
certain politicians alleged it would institutionalize bailouts. See Greg Hitt & 
Damian Paletta, Senate Ends Financial Bill Standoff, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 
2010, at A2. The plan by eleven European Union countries to impose a Financial 
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member banks to contribute to a Deposit Insurance Fund to en-
sure that depositors of failed banks are repaid.178 Similarly, U.S. 
law requires each owner of a nuclear reactor to contribute mon-
ies to a fund to compensate for possible reactor accidents.179 
Taxing systemically important firms in this way, to create a 
bailout fund, should reduce the public cost of providing bailouts. 
By internalizing costs, it should also reduce moral hazard. In-
deed, the likelihood that systemically important firms will have 
to make additional contributions to the fund to replenish bailout 
monies should motivate those firms to cross monitor each other 
and thereby help control each other’s risky behavior.180 
Privatizing bailout costs raises at least two practical con-
cerns. First, we have insufficient experience to precisely deter-
mine these costs and thus to assess the exact amount each sys-
temically important firm should be taxed. If taxes are too low, 
taxpayer funding may be needed to cover shortfalls.181 If taxes 
are too high, economic efficiency may decrease because financial 
firms have less capital to invest.182 Regulators should be able to 
at least roughly estimate these costs, however, by attempting to 
match the firm in question to the most “comparable company” 
 
Transactions Tax (FTT) provides another possible precedent for a privatized 
bailout fund. See European Commission Press Release IP/13/115, Financial 
Transaction Tax Under Enhanced Cooperation: Commission Sets out the De-
tails (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-115_en 
.htm. 
 178. 12 U.S.C. § 1815(d) (2012). 
 179. OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, NUCLEAR IN-
SURANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF (2014), https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc 
-collections/fact-sheets/nuclear-insurance.html. 
 180. Regulating Financial Change, supra note 59, at 1490. 
 181. Cf. Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How 
Law Can Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 125–
26 (2013) (cautioning that some amount of taxpayer funding will likely be 
needed to cover bailout fund shortfalls); Adam Geršl & Petr Jakubík, How Im-
portant Is the Adverse Feedback Loop for the Banking Sector?, 60 EKONOMICKÝ 
ČASOPIS 32, 34 (2012) (arguing that too small of a bailout fund could prove to be 
procyclical by letting banks have too much capital and not enough of an insur-
ance cushion). 
 182. Cf. European Cmm’n, Bail-In Tool: A Comparative Analysis of the In-
stitutions’ Approaches 4 (Oct. 18, 2013) (unpublished working paper) (on file 
with Minnesota Law Review) (“[M]ost banks today appear to have enough capi-
tal and bail-in-able liabilities to withstand losses in non-extreme cases without 
resorting to resolution funds or state support. . . . It is also important to . . . 
avoid unintended consequences such as spurring moral hazard by creating [an] 
excessively large resolution fund.”). 
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that has received bailout money in the past,183 based on the 
tracking of data for bailout recipients in connection with the fi-
nancial crisis.184 Furthermore, the bailout fund is contemplated 
merely as a fallback to the primary remedy of imposing a public 
governance duty. If that remedy works, relatively few systemi-
cally important firms would need a bailout. This Article’s pro-
posal for a bailout fund should therefore be much more practical 
than previously advanced conceptions for bailout funds as a pri-
mary remedy.185 
Another practical concern186 is the need for international co-
operation, so as not to drive systemically important firms in 
high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions. This type of con-
cern, though, has been addressed extensively by the interna-
tional community in implementing the various Basel Capital Ac-
cords187 as well as so-called soft law initiatives.188 
The foregoing discussion assumes that central banks will 
have authority to use monies in the bailout fund to provide the 
 
 183. I say roughly estimate because a comparable company’s approach is 
never based on exactly comparable companies. ASWATH DAMODARAN, APPLIED 
CORPORATE FINANCE 565 (4th ed. 2015). Comparability might be assessed based 
on factors that relate to systemic riskiness, such as size, interconnectedness, 
substitutability, and leverage. See, e.g., IMF et al., Guidance To Assess the Sys-
temic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial 
Considerations, Report to the G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Gover-
nors (Oct. 2009), https://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/100109.pdf. The ac-
tual mechanics of the sizing could potentially raise other questions, such as the 
following: how should the aggregate need for funding be estimated? How should 
funding be allocated among contributing firms, initially and over time? 
 184. See Bailout Recipients, PROPUBLICA, http://projects.propublica.org/ 
bailout/list/index (last updated Sept. 12, 2017) (providing a bailout list, which 
tracks every dollar and every recipient of U.S. government bailout money). 
 185. See Gorden & Muller, supra note 176; cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic 
Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strat-
egies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 801–02 (2011) (“Given high 
correlation, the failure of one institution implies that all institutions facing cor-
related risks will face a similar crisis. Insurance cannot solve such an industry-
wide problem because no industry-funded insurance fund could ever be suffi-
cient to insure against much of the industry’s failure.”). 
 186. Privatizing bailout costs may also raise political concerns. Cf. supra 
note 177 (observing that although an earlier version of the Dodd-Frank Act in-
cluded a provision for a privatized bailout fund, the provision was dropped after 
certain politicians alleged it would institutionalize bailouts); Wilmarth, supra 
note 6, at 954 (discussing political opposition to taxpayer-funded bailouts). 
 187. See supra notes 84–88 and accompanying text. 
 188. Cf. Andrew P. Morriss & Lotta Moberg, Cartelizing Taxes: Understand-
ing the OECD’s Campaign Against “Harmful Tax Competition”, 4 COLUM. J. TAX 
L. 1, 21 (2012) (discussing soft law initiatives by international organizations 
such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 
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necessary bailouts. The central bank’s authority to provide 
bailouts should therefore be restored in jurisdictions, such as the 
United States,189 where it has been limited. Furthermore, the 
central bank’s authority to provide bailouts should be expanded 
in all jurisdictions, as needed, to cover not only banks but also 
nonbank systemically important financial firms. 
Finally, in sizing a bailout fund, regulators will need to con-
sider whether the fund should be sufficient to bail out not only 
illiquid but also insolvent systemically important firms. For an 
insolvent firm, liquidity would provide only temporary relief 
from default.190 Regulators might consider, for example, whether 
it would be sensible to combine a privatized liquidity bailout 
fund with a resolution mechanism, such as the conversion of debt 
to equity discussed in Part III.C,191 in order to make the firm 
solvent again. Even if a resolution mechanism is insufficient and 
too costly as a primary tool to control excessive risk-taking, it 
might be more effective as a supplemental remedy to help reduce 
potential bailout costs.192 Additionally, whether or not higher 
capital requirements would discourage excessive risk-taking, 
they would certainly make a systemically important firm’s insol-
vency less likely193 and therefore should be considered for this 
purpose.  
  CONCLUSION   
Why do systemically important financial firms engage in ex-
cessive risk-taking? Most attribute it to moral hazard: the idea 
that such a firm will take risks assuming it will profit from suc-
cess and, being “too big to fail,” be bailed out to prevent its fail-
ure. This Article begins by showing that attributing excessive 
risk-taking to moral hazard is unsupported by evidence and in-
consistent with management incentives. That calls into question 
 
 189. See supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text. 
 190. Liquidity would only temporarily enable an insolvent firm to pay its 
debts; because its assets are less than its liabilities, an insolvent firm is likely 
to ultimately default. 
 191. See supra notes 112–27 and accompanying text. 
 192. A resolution mechanism that takes into account a statistical spreading 
of insolvency risk among multiple systemically important firms would be espe-
cially cost-effective as a supplemental remedy. 
 193. See, e.g., Admati, supra note 82, at R10; but cf. Òscar Jordà, Björn Rich-
ter, Moritz Schularick, & Alan M. Taylor, Bank Capital Redux: Solvency, Li-
quidity, and Crisis 36–37 (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., Working Paper No. 2017-
06, 2017) (concluding, based on empirical data, that higher bank capital ratios 
are unlikely to prevent a financial crisis, though they may facilitate much 
quicker recoveries from financial crisis recessions). 
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the efficacy of regulation designed to reduce that risk-taking by 
reducing moral hazard.194 
Traditional corporate governance law, this Article argues, is 
more likely to cause systemically important firms to engage in 
excessive risk-taking. Such law requires managers to consider 
risk-taking from the standpoint of the firm and its investors. 
Much of the harm from a systemically important firm’s failure, 
however, would be externalized onto the public. As a result, risk-
taking that is excessive from a public perspective might actually 
benefit the firm and its investors (and therefore comply with cor-
porate governance law).195 
The Article shows that requiring managers of systemically 
important firms to account for systemic externalities in their 
governance decisions would help to align private and public in-
terests. That, in turn, should reduce excessive risk-taking. The 
Article also analyzes how to align these interests and reduce that 
risk-taking without unduly weakening corporate wealth-produc-
ing capacity. 
Reducing excessive risk-taking would make systemically 
important firms less likely to fail.196 It could not, however, com-
pletely eliminate the chance of failure. Even firms that take pru-
dent risks could fail due to exogenous shocks.197 That leaves the 
problem, albeit attenuated, that systemically important firms 
will occasionally need to be bailed out. To minimize taxpayer 
cost, the Article finally proposes requiring systemically im-
portant firms to contribute to a privatized bailout fund. 
 
 194. More technically, as this Article explains, systemically important firms 
do not engage in excessive risk-taking because of bailout-induced moral hazard; 
such risk-taking is instead caused by a form of moral hazard that results from 
externalizing systemic harm onto the public. 
 195. In this sense—viewing externalities as a market failure—corporate gov-
ernance law can cause market failures when applied to systemically important 
firms. 
 196. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (observing that a systemically 
important firm’s failure would most likely result from excessive risk-taking). 
Although this Article argues for a public governance “duty,” other more incre-
mental, though less effective, steps are also possible to try to align private and 
public interests. One would be to expand on the idea of certain “constituency” 
statutes that permit, but do not require, managers to take into account potential 
systemic harm—effectively, a public governance right. Another such step might 
be to harness bondholders, who are more risk averse than shareholders, in the 
governance of systemically important firms. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethink-
ing Corporate Governance for a Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky 
World, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1335, 1349 (2017). 
 197. See supra text accompanying note 24. 
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  ANNEX 1   
 CALCULATING EXPECTED VALUE DISPARITY 
As discussed, systemically important firms can engage in 
risk-taking ventures that have a positive expected value to their 
investors but a negative expected value to the public.198  
Consider managers of a systemically important firm decid-
ing whether to engage in a risky project that could be profitable. 
The expected value of the project to the firm’s investors (usually 
the shareholders), which I’ll call α, can be calculated as follows: 
α (expected value of project to investors) = 
[X% chance of project succeeding × $Y value to investors 
from that success199] − [(1 − X% chance of project failing) 
× $W loss from that failure]. 
Compare that to the expected value of the project to the public, 
which I’ll call β: 
β (expected value of project to public) = 
[X% chance of project succeeding × N value to public from 
that success] – [(1−X% chance of project failing) × F % 
chance of firm failing as a result of the project’s failure × 
$Z resulting systemic costs].200 
Most of these values would be pure business judgments about 
which the firm’s managers should have sufficient information, or 
at least much more information than third parties. For example, 
those managers should have much more information than third 
parties about valuing X%, the chance of the project being suc-
cessful; $Y, the value to investors from that success; $W, the loss 
from the project’s failure; and F %, the chance of the firm failing 
as a result of the project’s failure (that is, effectively as a result 
of the $W loss). The exceptions, however, are the values for $Z, 
the systemic costs if the firm fails, and the values for N, the value 
to the public from the project’s success. 
Government financial regulators are likely to know much 
more about valuing $Z than the firm’s managers. That valuation 
should therefore be a public policy choice. Although there are 
several possible ways of valuing $Z, for illustrative purposes I 
 
 198. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
 199. $Y, the value to investors from the project’s success, could be measured 
by profit or whatever other metric the firm normally uses. 
 200. For illustrative purposes, this equation has been simplified in several 
ways, including that it assumes the only way a risky project could cause sys-
temic costs is if the project’s failure causes the firm’s failure. That approach may 
miss other triggers of systemic risk, such as the negative effects of correlated 
portfolios. 
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will base its value on the estimated cost of a government bailout 
to avoid a systemic failure. Such an estimate could be required 
to be made by the government, for example, as part of the process 
of designating a firm as a systemically important financial insti-
tution201 and thereafter periodically updated by the government. 
Valuing N should also be a public policy choice. Certainly 
the success of an individual firm’s project has at least indirect 
value to the public, such as increasing job creation and economic 
growth. Quantifying that value is difficult, however, because it 
is so diffuse. For illustrative purposes, I will assume it is rela-
tively de minimis for any given project and thus can be treated 
as zero.  
Subject to the caution that the values chosen below rely on 
no hard empirical data and are solely illustrative (a quantitative 
analysis being no better than its assumptions), assume that the 
government has estimated the firm’s bailout cost ($Z) as $500 
million202 and that the firm’s managers estimate the other val-
ues as follows: 
X% (the chance of the project succeeding) = 80%. 
$Y (the value to investors from that success) = $50 mil-
lion. 
$W (the loss from the project’s failure) = $20 million. 
F % (the chance of the firm failing as a result of the pro-
ject’s failure) = 10%. 
Applying these values yields the following: 
α (expected value of the project to the firm’s investors) = 
[(80% chance of project succeeding) × $50 million value 
 to investors from that success] − [(20% chance of project 
failing) × $20 million loss from that failure] 
= $36 million. 
β (expected value of project to public) = 
[(80% chance of project succeeding) × $0 value to public 
 from that success] − [(20% chance of project failing) × 
10% chance of firm failing as a result of the project’s fail-
ure × $500 million resulting systemic costs] 
= − $10 million. 
 
 201. Such an estimate should, ideally, take into account both domestic and 
foreign bailout costs. If Country X is designating a global firm as systemically 
important, the bailout cost would include not only the Country X bailout cost 
but also the costs of any necessary foreign bailouts. 
 202. Much will depend on the government’s valuation of $Z, the systemic 
costs if the firm fails. If $Z were estimated as $1.5 billion, rather than $500 
million, the expected value of the project’s systemically harmful costs would 
equal $30 million in the above illustration instead of the $10 million cost shown 
in the current example. 
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This project thus has a positive expected value to the firm’s in-
vestors but a negative expected value (that is, a cost) to the pub-
lic. 
  ANNEX 2   
 
 COMMENTS ON THE MINNEAPOLIS PLAN TO END TOO BIG TO 
FAIL 
Set forth below are the author’s comments, delivered to the 
Minneapolis Fed. on December 9, 2016, on its proposed Plan To 
End Too Big To Fail.203 
The Minneapolis Plan’s focus on the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) 
problem appears to conflate, or at least ignore, cause and effect. 
The TBTF problem is widely viewed as comprising two evils: that 
systemically important banks might engage in excessive risk-
taking because they would profit by a success and expect to be 
bailed out by the government to avoid a failure; and that govern-
ment will have little choice but to bail out failing systemically 
important banks, lest their losses be imposed on other banks. 
The Minneapolis Plan focuses only on the latter evil—the effect, 
not the cause. 
Indeed, the Plan specifically defines the “TBTF problem” as 
having that narrow focus: merely being the possibility that “the 
largest and most systemically important banks fail and impose 
their losses onto other banks.” Plan p. 2. This ignores how sys-
temically important banks contributed to the 2007–08 financial 
crisis and could touch off future crises. A comprehensive plan to 
solve the TBTF problem should also examine the fundamental 
question of why systemically important banks might fail. 
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission has begun that ex-
amination, identifying excessive risk-taking by systemically im-
portant banks as a primary cause of the financial crisis. FIN. CRI-
SIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: 
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF 
THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 
xviii–xix (2011). Others concur with that view. See, e.g., Jacob J. 
Lew, Opinion, Let’s Leave Wall Street’s Risky Practices in the 
Past, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2015), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/opinions/bacob-lew-lets-leave-wall-streets-risky-
practices-in-the-past/2015/01/09/cf25b5f6-95d8-11e4-aabd-
d0b93ff613d5_story.html (repeatedly attributing the financial 
 
 203. See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text. 
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crisis to “excessive risks taken by financial” firms); The Origins 
of the Financial Crisis: Crash Course, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 
2013), http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-
effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-years-article 
(identifying excessive risk-taking as one of three causes of the 
financial crisis, the other causes being irresponsible lending and 
regulators being “asleep at the wheel”). 
If excessive risk-taking causes systemically important 
banks to fail (requiring them to be bailed out before they “impose 
their losses onto other banks”), any plan to address the TBTF 
problem should also address that risk-taking. Some have already 
examined excessive risk-taking and its causes. See, e.g., “Too Big 
to Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, and Corporate Responsibility,” 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2847026 (arguing that ex-
cessive risk-taking may result less from moral hazard and more 
from a legally embedded conflict between corporate governance 
and the public interest that allows managers of systemically im-
portant firms to ignore systemic externalities). The Minneapolis 
Plan does not, however, take the cause of failure into account. 
Ignoring causation can undermine the Plan’s recommenda-
tions. Because the Plan implicitly assumes that systemically im-
portant banks fail, its recommendations center on requiring high 
levels of common-equity capital to prevent such failures. Some 
economists (such as Professors Admati and Hellwig, whom I 
greatly respect) argue that high capital requirements have little 
associated public costs, but others argue to the contrary. Without 
attempting to resolve that debate, I merely observe that if high 
capital requirements are costly, it would be worth examining 
whether other more targeted remedies (such as trying to miti-
gate the corporate governance conflict) could be more efficient. 
Here is a simple way to think about this last point. The 
Dodd-Frank Act’s limiting the Fed’s bailout powers under § 13(3) 
of the Federal Reserve Act has been analogized to shutting down 
fire departments in order to make homeowners more careful 
about starting fires. If requiring high levels of common-equity 
capital to prevent a bank failure is in fact very costly, then the 
Plan’s requirement that systemically important banks hold that 
capital is like making houses completely fireproof instead of im-
proving the effectiveness of fire departments. That may well pre-
vent the houses from burning down, but it is likely to be ex-
tremely expensive. 
Ignoring causation raises other problems in the Plan, 
though less serious. For example, the Plan states that as a result 
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of the TBTF problem—which, as indicated, it defines as the pos-
sibility that systemically important banks fail and impose their 
losses onto other banks—”trillions of dollars in American wealth 
was destroyed.” Plan p. 2. But that wealth destruction resulted 
from the financial crisis itself. The net cost of bailing out system-
ically important banks may actually be relatively minimal be-
cause the government has been recouping much of that invest-
ment. 
